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Cases › ENG14IA027 › The analyst

BOEING 747Delta Air Lines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

5
timed facts
8
precedents
17
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

5 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 18:04:47 UTCFDRinitial climbp.3
    engine 4 N1 decreased from 96.38% RPM to 61.13% RPM, approximately 19 seconds after takeoff
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 18:05:52 UTCFDRinitial climbp.3
    engine 4 fire warning transitioned from normal to fire warning
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 18:06:44 UTCFDRclimbp.3
    engine 4 N1 decreased to 0% RPM and remained at 0% RPM for the rest of the flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 18:09:05 UTCFDRclimbp.3
    engine 4 fire warning transitioned back to normal and remained at normal for the rest of the flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 19:23:48 UTCFDRlandingp.3
    gear weight on wheels transitioned from air to ground indicating the aircraft touched down
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 5 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Initial climb: Loss of engine power (total)→
  2. Initial climb: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail→
  3. Initial climb: Fire/smoke (non-impact)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG08IA0382008-08-06no fatalitiesmatch 50
    BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Las Vegas, NV
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG17IA0262017-06-07no fatalitiesmatch 49
    BOEING 747 451 · Delta Air Lines
    Tokyo, JP
    Loss of engine power (total)
  • CEN12FA1002011-12-094 fatalmatch 49
    CESSNA 421C · Quest Aviation Inc.
    Sioux Falls, SD
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG12IA0122012-02-13no fatalitiesmatch 48
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-10-30F · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
    Portland, OR
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • DCA21FA0852021-02-20no fatalitiesmatch 47
    BOEING 777-222 · United Airlines
    Broomfield, CO
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG11IA0212011-03-17no fatalitiesmatch 46
    BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 402 · Colgan Air, Inc.
    Pittsburgh, PA
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG09IA0022009-01-02no fatalitiesmatch 45
    BOEING 777 · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG14IA0282014-09-18no fatalitiesmatch 45
    AIRBUS A320 232 · jetBlue Airways
    Long Beach, CA
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 6 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • 4 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 3 of 8Engine shutdown
  • 2 of 8Loss of engine power (total)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • —
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
  • Development › Design
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG08IA0382008-08-06 · BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The engine experienced an uncontained release of high pressure turbine material due to fatigue cracks that occurred on four consecutive blade retainig lugs on the 2nd stage turbine hub. The cracked lugs resulted in the release of four 2nd stage turbine blades that penetrated the engine's cases and nacelle. The lugs cracked due to loss of material and resultant increase in stress load on the blade slot serrations due to excessve grit blasting when the hub was being overhauled by Delta Air Lines. Contributing to the…
  • ENG17IA0262017-06-07 · BOEING 747 451 · Delta Air Lines
    The PW4056 engine lost power due to the fatigue fracture of a 5th stage compressor blade. The cause of the fatigue fracture could not be determined.
  • CEN12FA1002011-12-09 · CESSNA 421C · Quest Aviation Inc.
    The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed after shutting down one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to follow the guidance contained in the pilot’s operating handbook, which advised feathering the propeller of the secured engine and retracting the flaps and landing gear.
  • ENG12IA0122012-02-13 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-10-30F · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
    The fracture of the fan mid shaft due to a stress corrosion cracking initiated by local regions of corrosion pitting, which resulted from oil migration within the shaft and its subsequent degradation.
  • DCA21FA0852021-02-20 · BOEING 777-222 · United Airlines
    The fatigue failure of the right engine fan blade. Contributing to the fan blade failure was the inadequate inspection of the blades, which failed to identify low-level indications of cracking, and the insufficient frequency of the manufacturer’s inspection intervals, which permitted the low-level crack indications to propagate undetected and ultimately resulted in the fatigue failure. Contributing to the severity of the engine damage following the fan blade failure was the design and testing of the engine inlet, w…
What it recommended after them
  • A-08-085TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 engines be removed from service for inspection of the 2nd stage turbine hubs when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident en… · ENG08IA038Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-08-086TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 2nd stage turbine hubs undergo recurring inspections when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident engine (10,880 hours and/o… · ENG08IA038Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).