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Cases › ENG14IA001 › The analyst

AIRBUS A319 132Spirit Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

18
timed facts
8
precedents
21
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

18 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 13:36:22 CDTFDRtakeoffp.3
    Aircraft took off
  2. 13:47:18 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 N1 began to reduce and engine 1 oil pressure increased
  3. 13:47:18 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    For 1 second, engine 1 EPR increased and then began to decrease
  4. 13:47:21 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1's N1 vibration increased from a prior steady-state value of 1.1 to 7.2; engine 1's N2 vibration increased from a prior steady-state value of 0.3 to 2.1
  5. 13:47:22 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 EGT Overlimit was activated, aircraft climbing through 19,588 feet pressure altitude
  6. around 13:47:22 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Autopilot was disengaged, re-engaged momentarily, then remained off for the rest of the flight
  7. 13:47:27 CDT to 13:51:30 CDTFDRclimb/responsep.3
    Thrust Lever Angle on both engines increased by about 10 degrees
  8. 13:47:33 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 oil temperature began to increase
  9. 13:47:40 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 EGT data became invalid (fluctuating between recorded values of 0°C and 2,560°C)
  10. 13:48:00 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Master warning occurred
  11. 13:49:46 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 switched from EPR to N1 mode
  12. 13:50:28 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 oil quantity began to decrease
  13. 13:50:33 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 oil pressure began to decrease
  14. 13:50:34 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1's N2 vibration increased to 9.9, as engine 1's N1 vibration fluctuated and decreased to between 2.2 and 4.5
  15. 13:51:14 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 fire warning began
  16. 13:51:50 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 fuel fire valve moved out of the 'not fully closed' position as the avionics smoke warning began
  17. 13:51:54 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Engine 1 low oil pressure warning began
  18. 13:51:54 to ~13:54:24 CDTFDRclimbp.3
    Over the next 2.5 minutes, the following warnings occurred: lavatory smoke, cargo smoke, forward lower cargo 1 smoke, forward lower cargo 2 smoke, aft lower cargo 1 smoke, and aft lower cargo 2 smoke
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 18 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute-climb to cruise: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG17IA0282017-06-10no fatalitiesmatch 92
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG08IA0382008-08-06no fatalitiesmatch 89
    BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG17IA0062016-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 86
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.
    Kansas, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG19IA0132019-02-21no fatalitiesmatch 81
    Boeing 737 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Orlando, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG17IA0082017-01-23no fatalitiesmatch 79
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2B19 · Endeavor Air
    Baltimore, MD
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • CEN13FA0492012-11-061 fatalmatch 77
    CESSNA 208B · Baron Aviation Services, Incorporated
    Wichita, KS
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ANC08IA0922008-07-29no fatalitiesmatch 77
    Saab-Scania AB (Saab) SAAB 340B · PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC
    Anchorage, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • CEN14FA0042013-10-091 fatalmatch 75
    BELL 206L 3 · PANTHER HELICOPTERS INC
    Venice, LA, USA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 7 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • 3 of 8Engine shutdown
  • 3 of 8Loss of engine power (total)
  • 2 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG17IA0282017-06-10 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    A Bombardier CRJ700 No. 1 engine failure caused by buckling of the combustion outer liner due to fatigue cracks. The liner buckling resulted in airflow disruption and reduced engine performance. The engine fuel control unit attempted to compensate for the decrease in engine performance by increasing the fuel flow rate. The combustion liner damage and increased fuel flow led to incomplete combustion of the fuel injected into the combustion chamber. Unconsumed fuel then ignited downstream of the combustion chamber (d…
  • ENG08IA0382008-08-06 · BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The engine experienced an uncontained release of high pressure turbine material due to fatigue cracks that occurred on four consecutive blade retainig lugs on the 2nd stage turbine hub. The cracked lugs resulted in the release of four 2nd stage turbine blades that penetrated the engine's cases and nacelle. The lugs cracked due to loss of material and resultant increase in stress load on the blade slot serrations due to excessve grit blasting when the hub was being overhauled by Delta Air Lines. Contributing to the…
  • ENG17IA0062016-11-29 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.
    The probable cause of the uncontained No. 1 (left) engine failure was a separated high pressure turbine 2nd stage blade that failed due to a fatigue crack that originated below the blade platform from an area of corrosion.
  • ENG19IA0132019-02-21 · Boeing 737 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    A No. 1 (left) engine high pressure compressor stage 2 blade separation. The blade separated due to a mixed-mode fatigue crack that originated on a blade disk post and was initiated by a misaligned (out-of-schedule) high pressure compressor stage 1 variable stator vane that was missing a washer and retaining nut on the vane trunnion stem.
  • ENG17IA0082017-01-23 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2B19 · Endeavor Air
    A Bombardier CRJ200 No. 2 engine failure due to the separation of a fan blade airfoil at a low cycle fatigue crack that originated at the forward fan blade pin hole attachment. The separated fan blade had previously undergone a hot form repair and both metallurgical analysis and repair records indicated that the lance/shot peen step required to restore sufficient residual stress levels to the blade material was not completed.
What it recommended after them
  • A-08-085TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 engines be removed from service for inspection of the 2nd stage turbine hubs when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident en… · ENG08IA038Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-08-086TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 2nd stage turbine hubs undergo recurring inspections when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident engine (10,880 hours and/o… · ENG08IA038Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).