Cases › ENG12IA001 › The analyst
BOEING 757-251Delta Air Lines Inc
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
2
timed facts
8
precedents
13
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
2 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 15:15:45 EDT (approx.)FDRPre-event/FDR power onp.3FDR first powered on and started recording data before the eventsee the traces at this moment ↗
- ~15:19:XX EDT (during takeoff roll, about 9 seconds of acceleration)FDRTakeoff roll - accelerationp.3Aircraft accelerated for approximately 9 seconds, computed airspeed reached a maximum of 60 knotssee the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- ~60 kiasFlight crew heard a loud bang and noted left engine fire indications; No. 1 (left) engine failure during takeoff roll
- Following the bang/fire indicationCaptain aborted the takeoff; aircraft decelerated for approximately 23 seconds
- After rejected takeoffThe airplane was taxied back to the gate without further incident and the passengers were deplaned normally
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 5 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Uncontained engine failure→
- Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Loss of engine power (partial)
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 747-451 · DELTA AIR LINES INCDetroit, MI
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Uncontained engine failure - BOEING MD-88 · DELTA AIR LINES INCAtlanta, GA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Uncontained engine failure - BOEING 747 · Delta Air LinesRussian airspace, JP
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Loss of engine power (partial) - BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INCLas Vegas, NV
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
- BOEING 747 451 · Delta Air LinesTokyo, JP
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
- BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.Kansas, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Uncontained engine failure - BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INCChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
- CESSNA 208B · Makani Kai AirKalaupapa, HI
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)cited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 3 of 8Uncontained engine failure
- 3 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
- 2 of 8Engine shutdown
- 2 of 8Loss of engine power (total)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ENG12IA0032011-10-23 · BOEING 747-451 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
The penetration of turbine blade fragments through the rear turbine case, which punctured the No. 4 bearing oil pressure supply tube, allowing misted oil to contact the hot engine case and ignite the undercowl fire. Contributing to the incident was the installation of approved (but not preferred) stage 3 low pressure turbine outer transition duct segments with the riveted rear seal configuration and the failure of the engine design to comply with the engine debris containment requirements of 14 Code of Federal R…
- ENG13IA0052012-11-07 · BOEING MD-88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
The 4th stage turbine blade separation that resulted in an uncontained release of low pressure turbine blade material was Delta Air Lines' repair process for the turbine blades' tip shrouds. It was not possible to identify the part of the repair process that led to the premature wear of the blade's tip shoud and subsequent separation.
- ENG16IA0012015-10-02 · BOEING 747 · Delta Air Lines
The PW4056 engine experienced an in-flight loss of power because of damage to the low-pressure turbine (LPT) because of the inadequate overhaul inspection and repair instructions that existed at the time of the LPT module's last overhaul. A vane hook in the LPT case wore to the point to allow a 3rd stage turbine vane cluster to disengage and eventually fall into the path of the 3rd stage turbine blades causing extensive downstream damage to the LPT module.
- ENG08IA0382008-08-06 · BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
The engine experienced an uncontained release of high pressure turbine material due to fatigue cracks that occurred on four consecutive blade retainig lugs on the 2nd stage turbine hub. The cracked lugs resulted in the release of four 2nd stage turbine blades that penetrated the engine's cases and nacelle. The lugs cracked due to loss of material and resultant increase in stress load on the blade slot serrations due to excessve grit blasting when the hub was being overhauled by Delta Air Lines. Contributing to the…
- ENG17IA0262017-06-07 · BOEING 747 451 · Delta Air Lines
The PW4056 engine lost power due to the fatigue fracture of a 5th stage compressor blade. The cause of the fatigue fracture could not be determined.
What it recommended after them
- A-08-085TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 engines be removed from service for inspection of the 2nd stage turbine hubs when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident en… · ENG08IA038Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-086TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 2nd stage turbine hubs undergo recurring inspections when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident engine (10,880 hours and/o… · ENG08IA038Closed - Acceptable Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).