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BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 402Colgan Air, Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

13
timed facts
8
precedents
10
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

13 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 12:02:30 EDTFDRTakeoffp.3
    Weight on wheels main gear transitioned from 'Grnd' to 'Air'
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 12:27:32 EDTFDRCruise at 23,000 ftp.3
    Master warning transitioned from 'No Warning' to 'Warning'; engine 1 oil pressure transitioned from 'No Warn' to 'Warn' and remained 'Warn' for rest of flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 12:27:41 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Master warning transitioned back to 'No Warning'
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 12:28:58 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Engine 1 torque decreased to 58%, engine 2 torque remained 71%, engine 1 fuel flow decreased to 1,328 pph, engine 2 fuel flow remained 1,288 pph
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 12:29:00 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Engine 1 torque decreased to 41%, engine 1 fuel flow decreased to 856 pph
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 12:29:08 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Engine 1 torque decreased to 0%, engine 2 torque decreased slightly to 70%, engine 1 fuel flow increased to 1,312 pph, engine 2 fuel flow decreased slightly to 1,272 pph
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 12:29:10 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Master warning transitioned back to 'Warning'; CWP Check Fire Det transitioned from 'No Warning' to 'Warning' and remained 'Warning' for rest of flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 12:29:18 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Master caution transitioned from 'Off' to 'On'
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 12:29:27 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Engine 1 fuel flow decreased to 0 pph
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 12:29:52 EDTFDRCruisep.3
    Master warning transitioned back to 'No Warning' and remained 'No Warning' for rest of flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 12:30:15 EDTFDRCruise/Descentp.4
    Master caution transitioned back to 'Off' and remained 'Off' for rest of flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 12:30:53 EDTFDRDescentp.4
    Aircraft began its descent from 23,000 feet (approximately 3 minutes 21 seconds from when the engine 1 oil pressure transitioned from 'No Warn' to 'Warn')
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  13. 12:49:35 EDTFDRLandingp.4
    Weight on wheels main gear transitioned from 'Air' to 'Grnd'
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 13 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute-cruise: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail→
  2. Enroute-cruise: Fire/smoke (non-impact)→
  3. Enroute-cruise: Loss of engine power (total)→
  4. Enroute-cruise: Engine shutdown→
  5. Enroute-cruise: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG17IA0172017-03-19no fatalitiesmatch 63
    DOUGLAS DC 9 83 · Allegiant Air
    Dayton, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Engine shutdownFire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ERA22FA0862021-12-111 fatalmatch 62
    SWEARINGEN SA226 · CASTLE AVIATION INC
    Bedford, NH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • ENG17IA0282017-06-10no fatalitiesmatch 60
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ANC08IA0922008-07-29no fatalitiesmatch 58
    Saab-Scania AB (Saab) SAAB 340B · PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC
    Anchorage, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • CEN20FA0352019-12-072 fatalmatch 58
    Bell 407 · Panther Helicopters Inc
    Gulf of Mexico, GM
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • CEN13FA0492012-11-061 fatalmatch 56
    CESSNA 208B · Baron Aviation Services, Incorporated
    Wichita, KS
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • WPR13IA1442013-03-05no fatalitiesmatch 55
    BOMBARDIER DHC-8-402 · Horizon Air
    Danville, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • WPR14FA0682013-12-121 fatalmatch 54
    CESSNA 208B · Makani Kai Air
    Kalaupapa, HI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • 4 of 8Loss of engine power (total)
  • 2 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 2 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
  • 2 of 8Off-field or emergency landing
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG17IA0172017-03-19 · DOUGLAS DC 9 83 · Allegiant Air
    The probable cause of the No. 2 (right) engine fire was an uncontained generator failure. Deformed rotating generator components and/or metal fragments radially released by the generator severed the constant speed drive-to-oil cooler return line located adjacent to the generator and caused oil to spray onto hot generator and engine case surfaces that subsequently ignited.
  • ERA22FA0862021-12-11 · SWEARINGEN SA226 · CASTLE AVIATION INC
    The pilot’s failure to secure and feather the left engine and increase power on the right engine after a perceived loss of engine power in the left engine, which resulted in a loss of control and impact with terrain just short of the runway. Contributing to the accident was a reduction in engine power from the left engine due to a 1st stage turbine blade midspan separation and material loss in the 2nd stage stator that were the result of engine operation at high temperatures for an extended period of time.
  • ENG17IA0282017-06-10 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    A Bombardier CRJ700 No. 1 engine failure caused by buckling of the combustion outer liner due to fatigue cracks. The liner buckling resulted in airflow disruption and reduced engine performance. The engine fuel control unit attempted to compensate for the decrease in engine performance by increasing the fuel flow rate. The combustion liner damage and increased fuel flow led to incomplete combustion of the fuel injected into the combustion chamber. Unconsumed fuel then ignited downstream of the combustion chamber (d…
  • ANC08IA0922008-07-29 · Saab-Scania AB (Saab) SAAB 340B · PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC
    The failure of one of the stage 1 gas generator rotor blades due to high-cycle fatigue, resulting in a contained engine failure during the takeoff roll.
  • CEN20FA0352019-12-07 · Bell 407 · Panther Helicopters Inc
    A total loss of engine power due to the failure of the engine’s Nos. 3 and 4 bearings and the power turbine pinion gear, and subsequent loss of main rotor rpm, which resulted in a loss of control and impact with the water.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).