Cases › ENG11IA016 › The analyst
BOEING 757-2Q8DELTA AIR LINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
0
timed facts
8
precedents
7
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
Recorder events without a clock time
- 0631 CSTData began recording with the left engine beginning to power up
- 0632:50 CSTRight engine N2 began increasing
- approximately 0633:11 CSTFuel cutoff parameter changed from cutoff to not cutoff (about 21 seconds after N2 began increasing)
- 0633:27 CSTFuel flow for the right engine measured 8096 pph
- 0634:06 CSTFuel cutoff parameter for the right engine indicated cutoff and the N2 values decreased
- approximately 0656 CSTFDR stopped recording about 22 minutes later
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 6 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Standing-engine(s) start-up: Fire/smoke (non-impact)
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 757-222 · UNITED AIR LINES INCDenver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - BOEING 737-9 · United AirlinesNewark, NJ
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air LinesLas Vegas, NV
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JetBlue AirwaysNassau, BS
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - AIRBUS A330 223 · DELTA AIR LINES INCSeattle, WA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INCJamaica, NY
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - BOEING 767 · American AirlinesJamaica, NY
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact) - ATR ATR72 · American AirlinesSt. Croix, USA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Fire/smoke (non-impact)
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and controlcited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 8 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
- 3 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ENG09IA0072009-06-10 · BOEING 757-222 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
There was a malfunction of the electronic engine control (EEC) burner pressure (Pb) sensor that had an abnormally high indication that resulted in an excessive amount of fuel being pumped into the engine that was still at a sub-idle condition. Because the engine was still accelerating to idle, the limited airflow through the engine engine was insufficient for the amount of fuel and resulted in a tailpipe fire. The cause of the EEC's Pb sensor fault could not be determined.
- ENG23LA0312023-06-28 · BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
A No. 1 (left) engine fire due a fuel leak that originated from the fuel nozzle 17 b-nut connection that was not properly torqued in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual procedure.
- ENG17IA0362017-09-06 · BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
A No. 1 (left) engine undercowl fire caused by a fuel nozzle installation error during engine overhaul at Delta TechOps. A fuel nozzle b-nut was cross threaded, which allowed fuel to leak on hot engine case surfaces and subsequently ignite.
- ENG09IA0172009-09-03 · EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JetBlue Airways
failure of the engine high pressure turbine active clearance control valve fuel rod supply tube coupling seal due to a cross-threaded B-nut as installed during original manufacture.
- ENG17IA0032016-10-26 · AIRBUS A330 223 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
A No. 1 engine fire caused by a fuel manifold supply line high cycle fatigue crack which led to a fuel leak that subsequently ignited on hot engine case surfaces. The fatigue crack originated and progressed due to elevated fuel manifold assembly vibration levels. Engine vibration testing identified a combustor tone that excites a natural (resonant) frequency of the fuel manifolds at specific engine speeds on Pratt & Whitney PW4000-94 and -100 inch fan series engines that feature a TALON II combustor.
What it recommended after them
- A-12-047TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue an airworthiness directive to require the incorporation of General Electric Aircraft Engines Service Bulletin 73-0242, “Fuel and Control – (73-00-00) – Spray Shields and Support Bracket – Improv… · ENG12IA010Closed - Acceptable Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).