Cases › ENG10IA055 › The analyst
BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
26
timed facts
8
precedents
28
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
26 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 21:43:35FDRdescent through ~5,200 ft pressure altitudep.3Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:43:36FDRdescentp.3Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:43:38FDRdescentp.3Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:43:43FDRdescent through ~5,055 ft pressure altitudep.3Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:43:47FDRdescentp.3Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:44:04FDRdescentp.3Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:44:17FDRdescentp.3Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:44:20FDRdescentp.3Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:44:26FDRdescentp.3Gear Uplock-L and Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:44:27FDRdescentp.3Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Active' to 'Not Active'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:02FDRsteady altitude ~4,150 ftp.3Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:03FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:05FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:10FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:14FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:46:32FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:52:50FDRsteady altitude ~4,150 ftp.4Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:52:53FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:52:58FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:52:59FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:53:00FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Active' to 'Not Active'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:57:06FDRsteady altitude ~4,150 ftp.4Gear Uplock-L and Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:57:07FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active' and remained 'Active' for the rest of the recorded datasee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:57:12FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:57:19FDRsteady altitudep.4Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'see the traces at this moment ↗
- 22:10:08FDRlandingp.4Gear WOW-R transitioned from 'Air' to 'Grnd'see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 26 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Landing: Landing gear not configured
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INCNewark, NJ
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear not configured - Boeing 767 · Federal ExpressLos Angeles, CA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPChattanooga, TN
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLCChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INCCharlotte (CLT), NC
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INCMilwaukee, WI
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear not configured - DeHavilland DHC-8-311 · Piedmont AirlinesPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INCChantilly, VA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear not configured
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear systemcited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
- 3 of 8Landing gear not configured
- 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
- 2 of 8Aircraft maintenance event
- 2 of 8Aircraft structural failure
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA10IA0212010-01-10 · AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
A mechanical failure of internal components of the right main landing gear door actuator resulting in the flight crew being unable to fully extend the right main landing gear using the normal and alternate procedures. Contributing to this incident was a circular reference in the company Flight Manual in which the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist referred back to the Landing Gear Unsafe Indication After Extension checklist rather than the Landing Gear - Partial Gear or Gear Up Landing checklist.
- DCA20LA1382020-08-19 · Boeing 767 · Federal Express
The left main landing gear’s failure to extend due to the separation of the brake rod retaining hardware from the aft inboard wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
- DCA24FA0022023-10-05 · BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
The failure of the alternate gear extension system, which prevented the landing gear from being lowered. The cause of the system failure was a broken wire, due to tensile overload, between the alternate gear extend switch and the alternate extension power pack (AEPP), preventing the AEPP from energizing and supplying hydraulic fluid to the door lock release actuators for the nose landing gear and main landing gear. Contributing to the accident was the loss of the left hydraulic system due to a ruptured left main ge…
- DCA15IA0892015-03-14 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
The nose landing gear’s failure to fully extend due to missing and damaged fastening hardware on the drive arm assembly.
- ENG09IA0092009-07-15 · BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INC
The failure of the left hand main landing gear was caused by heat induced cracks resulting from abusive grinding/polishing of the chrome plate that was applied during the last overhaul.
What it recommended after them
- A-25-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to inspect the bannis latches on Boeing 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplane doors and, if necessary, modify or replace them so they comply with the correct confi… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to inspect and, if necessary, modify or rep… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to update their Boeing 757 200, 200CB, and -300 series airplane aircraft maintenance manuals (AMM) in accordance with the revised Boeing AMM and illustrated parts cat… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to update their aircraft maintenance manual… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-007TO BOEING: Once the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual and illustrated parts catalog are updated to provide a consistent and accurate depiction of the bannis latch assembly, issue a service bulletin advising Boeing 757 operators to insp… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-008TO BOEING: Issue a service bulletin advising operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757 200, 200CB, and -300 series) to inspect those airplanes and, if necessary, modify or… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-009TO BOEING: Review all pertinent aircraft maintenance manuals and illustrated parts catalogs for Boeing 727 and 737 model airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and -300 series) to ensure th… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).