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ATR ATR72American Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

7
timed facts
8
precedents
10
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

7 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 19:36:38FDRTakeoffp.3
    Aircraft took off
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. ~19:39:38FDRClimbp.3
    Autopilot engaged about 3 minutes after takeoff
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 19:41:13FDRIn-flight emergencyp.3
    Left engine fire warning started on the FDR, continuing until just after touchdown; master warning also indicated at this time and remained on for 6 seconds
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 19:41:25FDRIn-flight emergencyp.3
    Autopilot disengaged
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. ~19:41:27FDRIn-flight emergencyp.3
    Left engine power lever angle began to decrease, followed by left engine power decrease
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. ~19:41:37FDRIn-flight emergencyp.3
    Left engine propeller RPM reading began registering invalid data about 10 seconds after PLA began decreasing
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 19:47:31FDRLandingp.3
    Aircraft touched down
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • unspecifiedLeft engine torque reached 0% and remained at that value for the rest of the flight
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff: Fire/smoke (non-impact)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG23LA0312023-06-28no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG09IA0172009-09-03no fatalitiesmatch 74
    EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JetBlue Airways
    Nassau, BS
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06no fatalitiesmatch 73
    BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG11IA0162011-02-09no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOEING 757-2Q8 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Minneapolis, MN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG16IA0272016-07-07no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Jamaica, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG09IA0072009-06-10no fatalitiesmatch 71
    BOEING 757-222 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG12IA0102012-02-08no fatalitiesmatch 68
    BOEING 767 · American Airlines
    Jamaica, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG12IA0042011-10-23no fatalitiesmatch 65
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2C10 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 8 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 2 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG23LA0312023-06-28 · BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    A No. 1 (left) engine fire due a fuel leak that originated from the fuel nozzle 17 b-nut connection that was not properly torqued in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual procedure.
  • ENG09IA0172009-09-03 · EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JetBlue Airways
    failure of the engine high pressure turbine active clearance control valve fuel rod supply tube coupling seal due to a cross-threaded B-nut as installed during original manufacture.
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06 · BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    A No. 1 (left) engine undercowl fire caused by a fuel nozzle installation error during engine overhaul at Delta TechOps. A fuel nozzle b-nut was cross threaded, which allowed fuel to leak on hot engine case surfaces and subsequently ignite.
  • ENG11IA0162011-02-09 · BOEING 757-2Q8 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    the failure of the right engine's fuel control unit to operate correctly when the fuel metering valve became frozen in the full open position because of corrosion on the fuel metering valve slide and sleeve, which caused the engine to be overfueled during engine start and resulted in a tailpipe fire.
  • ENG16IA0272016-07-07 · BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Maintenance personnel's failure to ensure proper installation of a fuel tube O-ring, which resulted in an undercowl engine fire during initial climb.
What it recommended after them
  • A-12-047TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue an airworthiness directive to require the incorporation of General Electric Aircraft Engines Service Bulletin 73-0242, “Fuel and Control – (73-00-00) – Spray Shields and Support Bracket – Improv… · ENG12IA010Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).