Cases › DCA26MA352 › The analyst
BOEING 767-33A21 Air LLC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
0
timed facts
8
precedents
0
passages to ask
No probable cause yet
The Board has not determined a cause for this accident. The precedents and the record view below describe the pattern in past cases; they are not a finding about this one, and this page will not offer one.
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
How the Board coded the sequence
- Landing-landing roll: Runway excursion
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air LinesNew York, NYRunway excursion
- BOEING 747 · UNITED AIR LINES INCAnchorage, AKmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIRLINES INCFort Myers, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Boeing 737-300Amarillo, TXmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10FMemphis, TNmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Boeing 737-300 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COBURBANK, CAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- AIRBUS A319 115 · American AirlinesMiami, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- BOEING 767 · Dynamic InternationalFort Lauderdale, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 5 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 2 of 8Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA15FA0852015-03-05 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air Lines
the captain's inability to maintain directional control of the airplane due to his application of excessive reverse thrust, which degraded the effectiveness of the rudder in controlling the airplane's heading. Contributing to the accident were the captain's (1) situational stress resulting from his concerns about stopping performance and (2) attentional limitations due to the high workload during the landing, which prevented him from immediately recognizing the use of excessive reverse thrust.
- DCA10CA0322010-02-19 · BOEING 747 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
an inadvertent encounter with clear air turbulence.
- DCA25LA2382025-06-16 · BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIRLINES INC
The airplane’s inadvertent encounter with convective turbulence during descent, which resulted in serious injuries to two flight attendants.
- FTW03MA1602003-05-25 · Boeing 737-300
the flight crew's failure to align the airplane's ground track with the runway centerline before touchdown and the flight crew's failure to maintain directional control of the airplane after touchdown. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's decision to continue the approach and to land with a thunderstorm (with associated gusty and variable winds) reported at the airport and the heavy rain, which reduced the flight crew's visibility on short final.
- DCA04MA0112003-12-18 · McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F
1) the first officer's failure to properly apply crosswind landing techniques to align the airplane with the runway centerline and to properly arrest the airplane's descent rate (flare) before the airplane touched down; and 2) the captain's failure to adequately monitor the first officer's performance and command or initiate corrective action during the final approach and landing.
What it recommended after them
- A-16-020TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with Boeing and US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) conduct a study to examine reverse thrust engine pressure ratio (EPR)-related operational data, procedures, and training and (… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-16-021TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Encourage US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) implement the best practices identified in Safety Recommendation A-16-20 and (2) participate in an industry-wide monitoring program to verify th… · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
- A-16-022TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of MD-80 series airplanes to revise operational procedures to include a callout when reverse thrust power exceeds 1.3 engine pressure ratio during landings on a contaminated runway. · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
- A-16-023TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Continue to work with industry to develop the technology to outfit transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability re… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-16-024TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If the systems described in Safety Recommendation A-16-23 are shown to be technically and operationally feasible, work with operators and the system manufacturers to develop procedures that ensure tha… · DCA15FA085Open - Acceptable Response
- A-16-025TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators to provide (1) guidance that instructs flight attendants to remain at their assigned exits and actively monitor exit availability in all non-n… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-16-026TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop best practices related to evacuation communication, coordination, and decision-making during emergencies through the establishment of an industry working group and then issue guidance for 14 C… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-16-027TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Clarify guidance to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers to reinforce the importance of (1) having precise information about the number of passengers aboard an airplane, including… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).