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EMBRAER ERJ 170-100 LREnvoy Air Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

12
timed facts
8
precedents
14
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

12 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 15:14:09 CDTFDRdescentp.5
    The aircraft was descending through 10,000 feet (ft) at 249 knots (kts) calibrated airspeed. The autopilot was engaged. The vertical and lateral modes were flight level change (FLCH) and lateral navigation (LNAV), respectively. Nav1 and Nav2 selected frequencies were 114.2 Megahertz (MHz) and 113.0 MHz, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 15:15:50 CDTFDRdescentp.5
    The aircraft was at pressure altitude of 7,032 ft at 248 kts calibrated airspeed. The vertical and lateral modes were altitude hold (ALT HOLD) and LNAV, respectively. Nav1 selected frequency was changed to 108.4 MHz.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 15:17:50 CDTFDRapproachp.5
    Nav2 selected frequency was changed to 108.4 MHz.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 15:18:14 CDTFDRapproachp.5
    Nav2 selected frequency was changed to 113.0 MHz.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 15:19:30 CDTFDRapproachp.5
    The active lateral mode changed from LNAV to heading (HDG).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 15:19:54 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    Nav1 and Nav2 selected frequencies were changed to 108.95 MHz and 108.4 MHz, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 15:19:55 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    The glideslope and localizer deviation-1 were 1.4866 dots and -2.8352 dots, respectively, for one second before both changed back to 0 dots.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 15:19:58 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    Nav1 selected frequency was changed to 108.4 MHz and remained at this frequency for the remainder of the flight.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 15:20:26 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    Nav2 selected frequency was changed to 113.0 MHz and remained at this frequency for the remainder of the flight.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 15:21:08 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    The captain selected primary navigation changed from FMS1 to VOR/LOC1. One second later, the first officer's primary navigation changed from FMS2 to VOR/LOC2, where both remained for the remainder of the flight.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 15:22:54 CDTFDRapproachp.6
    The autopilot was disengaged.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 15:26:25 CDTFDRlandingp.6
    The aircraft landed on runway 10L at KORD.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 12 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing: Wrong surface or wrong airport

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA19FA0892019-03-04substantialmatch 71
    Embraer EMB145 · Commutair
    Presque Isle, ME
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • ANC13FA0302013-03-082 fatalmatch 70
    BEECH 1900C · ALASKA CENTRAL EXPRESS INC
    Aleknagik, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA22LA1332022-06-21no fatalitiesmatch 66
    BOEING 737-9 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Pittsburgh, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • DCA22LA1262022-06-08no fatalitiesmatch 65
    BOEING 757-236 · Federal Express Corporation
    Tulsa, OK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • ANC20LA0462020-05-151 fatalmatch 62
    Cessna A185 · Webster James M
    Nuiqsut, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • ANC20LA0852020-08-272 fatalmatch 61
    Cessna A185
    Fairbanks, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 61
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • ANC11CA1012011-09-10no fatalitiesmatch 59
    DOUGLAS DC-8-62F · Air Transport International LLC
    Yakota, JP
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • 2 of 8Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Action

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA19FA0892019-03-04 · Embraer EMB145 · Commutair
    The flight crew’s decision, due to confirmation bias, to continue the descent below the decision altitude when the runway had not been positively identified. Contributing to the accident were (1) the first officer’s fatigue, which exacerbated his confirmation bias, and (2) the failure of CommutAir pilots who had observed the localizer misalignment to report it to the company and air traffic before the accident.
  • ANC13FA0302013-03-08 · BEECH 1900C · ALASKA CENTRAL EXPRESS INC
    The flight crew's failure to maintain terrain clearance, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's failure to correctly read back and interpret clearance altitudes issued by the air traffic controller, their failure to adhere to minimum altitudes depicted on the published instrument approach chart, and their failure to adhere to company checklists. Also contributing to the accident were the air traffic control…
  • DCA22LA1332022-06-21 · BOEING 737-9 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The flightcrew’s misidentification of the intended landing runway, which resulted in approach to and landing on the wrong runway. Contributing to the incident was the distraction caused by the dual reset of the flight management computer displays.
  • DCA22LA1262022-06-08 · BOEING 757-236 · Federal Express Corporation
    The flight crew’s misidentification of the intended landing runway. Contributing to the incident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to perceive and correctly interpret visual and auditory indicators – including electronic guidance – that they were approaching the incorrect runway which was likely the result of a degradation in cognitive function brought on by working within their window of circadian low, increased workload, and fatigue, and (2) the air traffic controller’s failure to monitor the arriving flight af…
  • ANC20LA0462020-05-15 · Cessna A185 · Webster James M
    The pilot’s controlled flight into flat snow-covered terrain in weather conditions that were conducive to flat light conditions.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).