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BOEING 757-236FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

5
timed facts
8
precedents
27
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

5 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 22:24 EDTFDRTakeoffp.6
    Aircraft departed Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport (CHA)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 22:24:09FDRClimbp.6
    Indicated quantity of hydraulic fluid in the left hydraulic system and the left hydraulic system pressure started to decrease
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. Shortly after 22:24:09FDRClimbp.6
    Left hydraulic system low quantity indication and master caution were recorded
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. About 23:47FDRLandingp.6
    Acceleration data indicate the aircraft landed on runway 20 with the landing gear not extended
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 23:47:37FDRLanding rollp.6
    Recording ended
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • About 5 seconds after takeoffCrew moved the landing gear lever handle to the 'up' position
  • Not specifiedAircraft leveled off at about 4,800 feet MSL, turned back toward CHA, and performed two passes over the airport at a low altitude
  • Not specifiedAircraft maneuvered for a final approach to runway 20 at CHA
  • On final approachLanding gear lever indicated 'down', however data indicate the landing gear was not in the down and locked position
  • Shortly after landingEngine 1 and engine 2 fire warning indicated
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 10 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing: Abnormal runway contact

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA20LA1382020-08-19substantialmatch 84
    Boeing 767 · Federal Express
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 80
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA20LA0472019-12-23substantialmatch 79
    BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28no fatalitiesmatch 79
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA23LA4092023-08-03substantialmatch 78
    BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Chantilly, VA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • ENG09IA0092009-07-15no fatalitiesmatch 78
    BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INC
    Charlotte (CLT), NC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA25LA2752025-07-26substantialmatch 77
    BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA18FA1442018-04-20substantialmatch 76
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 83(MD-83) · Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc
    Alexandria, LA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 4 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 3 of 8Landing gear collapse
  • 3 of 8Landing gear not configured
  • 2 of 8Aircraft maintenance event
  • 2 of 8Aircraft structural failure
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA20LA1382020-08-19 · Boeing 767 · Federal Express
    The left main landing gear’s failure to extend due to the separation of the brake rod retaining hardware from the aft inboard wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10 · AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    A mechanical failure of internal components of the right main landing gear door actuator resulting in the flight crew being unable to fully extend the right main landing gear using the normal and alternate procedures. Contributing to this incident was a circular reference in the company Flight Manual in which the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist referred back to the Landing Gear Unsafe Indication After Extension checklist rather than the Landing Gear - Partial Gear or Gear Up Landing checklist.
  • DCA20LA0472019-12-23 · BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
    Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during its initial overhaul, which caused heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue crack that caused the pin to fail during the accident flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the excessive grinding during the initial overhaul and the fatigue crack during the subsequent overhaul.
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally and manually for reasons that could not be conclusively determined.
  • DCA23LA4092023-08-03 · BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Improper overhaul of the trunnion cross-pin hole that resulted in the development of stress corrosion cracking and eventual failure of the right forward trunnion.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).