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Cases › DCA23LA384 › The analyst

BOEING 767-322UNITED AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

20
timed facts
8
precedents
14
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

20 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 07:32:32 CDTFDRDeparturep.6
    N641UA departed runway 22R at EWR.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 07:36:17 CDTFDRClimb/Cruisep.6
    The autopilot was engaged. The takeoff, cruise, and approach were uneventful.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 10:26:25 CDTFDRApproachp.6
    The localizer mode was operational.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 10:28:25 CDTFDRApproachp.6
    Pressure altitude was 6,045 ft, computed airspeed was 214 kts, and magnetic heading was 265 deg. Localizer and glideslope deviation were -0.04 dots and -0.18 dots, respectively. Flap handle was 5 deg. The speedbrake handle was in the down position.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 10:31:47 CDTFDRApproachp.6
    The landing gear was down and locked. The flap handle was 15 deg. The speedbrake handle was in the down position. Localizer and glideslope deviation were 0.00 dots.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 10:33:49 CDTFDRFinal Approachp.6
    Radio altitude was 635 ft, computed airspeed was 142 kts, and magnetic heading was 266 deg. Localizer and glideslope deviation were -0.02 dots and 0.00 dots, respectively. The flap handle was 30 deg. The speedbrake handle was in the down position. The autopilot was disengaged.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 10:34:31 CDTFDRFinal Approachp.6
    Engines 1 and 2 throttle resolver angle (TRA) were 47.29 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 10:34:37 CDTFDRFinal Approachp.6
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 33.75 deg and 33.93 deg, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 10:34:41 CDTFDRLanding/Touchdownp.6
    The air-ground switch was ground, and the left and right main gear were not tilted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded at landing was 1.1465 g. The control column position recorded was approximately 0.35 deg. Speedbrake handle was down.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 10:34:42 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.6
    The maximum recorded control column position was 5.71 deg. The control wheel position was -14.96 deg and reduced to -6.53 deg. Speedbrake handle was down.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 10:34:43 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.6
    The maximum recorded control column and control wheel position were -4.39 deg and -24.48 deg, respectively. The right main gear changed from not tilted to tilted and the air-ground switch changed from ground to air. Vertical acceleration reduced from 1.2381 g to 0.6909 g within the second.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 10:34:44 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    The nose gear squat switched from air to ground and back to air, all within the second. The right main landing gear was not tilted. Vertical acceleration increased from 0.7344 g to 1.4258 g. The control column was 3.87 deg before it decreased to -4.75 deg. Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 34.28 deg. Speedbrake handle position was in the down position.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  13. 10:34:45 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 31.82 deg and 23.73 deg. Speedbrake handle changed from the down position to the up position within the second. Vertical acceleration reduced from 1.1442 g to 0.3430 g and back to 1.5540 g, all within the second. The nose gear squat changed from air to ground.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 10:34:46 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engines 1 and 2 thrust reversers were in transit. Vertical acceleration changed from 1.5540 g to 0.9863 g, increased to 1.5746 g, and reduced to 0.6314 g, all within the second. The nose gear squat was air for one sample of the second.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  15. 10:34:47 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engine 2 thrust reverser was fully deployed. The nose squat was ground, and the main gears were not tilted. Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 24.79 deg and 6.68 deg, respectively. Vertical acceleration was 0.7802 g and increased to 1.5563 g, and reduced to 0.7505 g, all within the second.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  16. 10:34:48 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 4.75 deg and 3.87 deg, respectively. Vertical acceleration hovered around 1 g for the remainder of the landing rollout.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 10:34:49 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engine 1 thrust reverser was fully deployed. The remainder of the landing rollout was uneventful.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  18. 10:34:59 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    The autobrakes disarmed was selected.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  19. 10:35:04 CDTFDRLanding Rolloutp.7
    Engines 1 and 2 thrust reversers switched from deployed to not deployed.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  20. 10:38:16 CDTFDREnd of Recordingp.7
    The last recorded sample was recorded.
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 20 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-flare/touchdown: Hard landing

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA19CA1672019-06-15substantialmatch 74
    Boeing 757 · United Airlines
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Hard landing
  • DCA09FA0482009-05-06substantialmatch 67
    BOEING DC-10 · World Airways
    Baltimore, MD
    • ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA24FA1202024-03-08substantialmatch 64
    BOEING 737-8 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA22LA0022021-09-27substantialmatch 60
    BOEING 757-224 · United Airlines Inc.
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30substantialmatch 60
    BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    San Diego, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA24LA0652024-01-10substantialmatch 60
    BOEING 737 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA17IA0202016-10-27no fatalitiesmatch 58
    BOEING 737 7L9 · Eastern Airlines Group, Inc.,
    New York, NY
    • ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 57
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 4 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
  • Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA19CA1672019-06-15 · Boeing 757 · United Airlines
    an improper landing flare, which resulted in a bounced landing and substantial damage.
  • DCA09FA0482009-05-06 · BOEING DC-10 · World Airways
    the captain’s inappropriate control inputs following a firm landing, resulting in two hard nose-gear impacts before executing a go-around. Contributing to the inappropriate control inputs was the captain’s fatigue and physical discomfort; and a possible lack of practical consolidation of skills and experience due to a protracted and fragmented training period.
  • DCA24FA1202024-03-08 · BOEING 737-8 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The captain's decision not to establish and maintain deceleration devices in accordance with company training and standard operating procedures.
  • DCA22LA0022021-09-27 · BOEING 757-224 · United Airlines Inc.
    The nose high attitude on landing resulted in a tailstrike.
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30 · BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    the first officer's failure to maintain the correct airspeed and pitch attitude during landing that resulted in a tailstrike.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).