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Cases › DCA23LA125 › The analyst

BOEING 737-900ERDelta Air Lines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

5
timed facts
8
precedents
31
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

5 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 20:44:15 ESTFDRTakeoff sequencep.6
    Start of FDR data window recorded during the incident
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. Between 20:44:15 and 20:45:15 ESTFDRTakeoffp.6
    Delta airplane pressed the TOGA switch
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. Between 20:44:15 and 20:45:15 ESTFDRTakeoff rollp.7
    Delta airplane reached a maximum computed airspeed of about 105 knots
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. Between 20:44:15 and 20:45:15 ESTFDRTakeoff abortp.6
    Delta airplane aborted the takeoff sequence
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 20:45:15 ESTFDRPost-abortp.6
    End of FDR data window recorded during the incident
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 5 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 2 - ATC LOCAL CONTROL AUDIO · 68 min· not yet aligned to a clockAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 3 - ATC GROUND CONTROL AUDIO · 87 min· not yet aligned to a clockAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 4 - ATC OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR POSITION AUDIO · 70 min· not yet aligned to a clockAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 5 - ATC TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR POSITION AUDIO · 88 min· not yet aligned to a clockAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 6 - ATIS RECORDING AUDIO · 42 min· not yet aligned to a clockAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ATTACHMENT 7 - ATC RECORDED TELEPHONE LINE AUDIO · 4 min· not yet aligned to a clock
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff: Runway incursion veh/AC/person→
  2. Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Runway incursion veh/AC/person→
  3. Taxi: Runway incursion veh/AC/person

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA23FA1492023-02-04no fatalitiesmatch 61
    BOEING 737-79P · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Austin, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Runway incursion veh/AC/person
  • OPS16IA0042016-01-29no fatalitiesmatch 58
    AIRBUS A321 231 · Spirit Airlines
    Fort Lauderdale, FL
    Runway incursion veh/AC/person
  • OPS15IA0112015-02-18no fatalitiesmatch 56
    EMBRAER EMB 145LR · American Eagle Airlines
    Chicago, IL
    Runway incursion veh/AC/person
  • OPS10IA0012009-10-19no fatalitiesmatch 52
    BOEING 767 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.
    Atlanta Hartsfield Intl. Apt. (KATL), GA
    • ●Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design
  • OPS21LA0022021-04-29no fatalitiesmatch 52
    AIRBUS A319-112 · Allegiant Air
    St Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA11IA0472011-04-26no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BOEING 737-7Q8 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA14CA0932014-05-12substantialmatch 51
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD90 - 30 · Drelat Air Lines, Inc.
    Boston, MA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA25LA1632025-03-20no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Orlando, FL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Runway incursion veh/AC/person
  • 2 of 8Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation
  • 2 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • Task performance › Communication (personnel)

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA23FA1492023-02-04 · BOEING 737-79P · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    the local controller’s incorrect assumption that the Southwest Airlines (SWA) airplane would depart from the runway before the Federal Express airplane arrived on the same runway, which resulted in a loss of separation between both airplanes. Contributing to the controller’s incorrect assumption were his expectation bias regarding the SWA airplane’s departure, his lack of situational awareness regarding the SWA airplane’s position when the flight crew requested takeoff clearance, and the air traffic control tower’s…
  • OPS16IA0042016-01-29 · AIRBUS A321 231 · Spirit Airlines
    The air traffic controller's failure to ensure the runway surface area was clear of vehicles before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. Also causal was the flight crew's decision to initiate a takeoff while the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs) were activated. Contributing to the incident was the lack of a standard procedure for vehicle operators to request runway clearances and resultant "hear back/read back" error between the vehicle operator and the air traffic controller.
  • OPS15IA0112015-02-18 · EMBRAER EMB 145LR · American Eagle Airlines
    The flight crew's failure to manage cockpit tasks during taxi resulting in a loss of situation awareness and subsequently taxiing past a required turn point and onto an active runway without clearance. Contributing to the runway incursion was the ground controllers ineffective monitoring to ensure issued taxi instructions were followed.
  • OPS10IA0012009-10-19 · BOEING 767 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.
    The flight crew’s failure to identify the correct landing surface due to fatigue. Contributing to the cause of the incident were (1) the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change, (2) the unavailability of the approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended landing, and (3) the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light technologies on the taxiway.
  • OPS21LA0022021-04-29 · AIRBUS A319-112 · Allegiant Air
    The air traffic controller’s failure to properly scan the runway and local area, and their general loss of situational awareness, resulting in a near midair collision. Contributing to the incident was the Cessna 337 pilot's poor decision making when he failed to fly the standard downwind leg distance from the runway and to maintain the standard traffic pattern altitude.
What it recommended after them
  • A-24-010TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: For airports that are certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 and are currently not equipped with airport surface detection equipment, model X (ASDE-X) or airport surface surv… · DCA23FA149Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-24-011TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require air traffic controllers to • advise pilots, through direct communication and automatic terminal information system broadcasts, when visual contact with aircraft operating on taxiways and run… · DCA23FA149Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-24-012TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Brief all air traffic controllers about the circumstances of this incident, emphasizing the effect that certain conditions might have on a pilot’s ability to begin a takeoff in a timely manner, includ… · DCA23FA149Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-24-013TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Amend the Aeronautical Information Manual so that it instructs pilots to inform controllers, before entering an active runway with the intent to depart, when they need time on the runway for any reaso… · DCA23FA149Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-24-014TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all airports with a Surface Movement Guidance and Control System plan to ensure that their plans and the associated letters of agreement correspond with each other and the stakeholder duties a… · DCA23FA149Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-24-015TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Direct training administrators at airports with a Surface Movement Guidance and Control System plan to require initial and annual refresher training for all stakeholders, including air traffic control… · DCA23FA149Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-24-016TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require training administrators at all operating air traffic control towers to conduct annual refresher training on low-visibility operations. · DCA23FA149Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-11-012TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Perform a technical review of Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X (ASDE-X) to determine if the capability exists systemwide to detect improper operations such as landings on taxiways. · OPS10IA001Closed - Unacceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).