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MITSUBISHI CL-600-2B19SKYWEST AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

24
timed facts
8
precedents
22
passages to ask

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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

24 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 14:14:42 CDTFDRapproachp.4
    Pressure altitude left was 3,027 ft, computed airspeed left was 214 kts, magnetic heading left was 91 deg. Landing gear down parameter was 'Not Down and Locked' and landing gear up parameter was 'Not Up and Locked', consistent with the landing gear being in transition. Lateral and vertical deviations were -0.02 dots and -0.54 dots, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 14:14:56 CDTFDRapproachp.4
    The nose and main landing gear down parameters were 'Down and Locked.' Flap position began to transition from 0 deg to 9 deg over the next 6 seconds.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 14:15:06 CDTFDRapproachp.4
    Pressure altitude left was 2,623 ft, computed airspeed left was 191 kts, magnetic heading left was 89 deg. Flap surface position was 19 deg. Lateral and vertical deviations were -0.02 dots and 0.05 dots, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 14:15:26 CDTFDRapproachp.4
    Pressure altitude left was 2,281 ft, computed airspeed left was 168 kts, flap surface position was 29 deg. Lateral and vertical deviations were 0.02 dots and -0.05 dots, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 14:15:41 CDTFDRapproachp.5
    Radio altitude right was 2,345 ft, computed airspeed right was 149 kts, magnetic heading right was 90 deg. Flap surface position was 44 deg. Lateral and vertical deviations were 0.02 dots and 0.07 dots, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 14:18:13 CDTFDRapproachp.5
    The aircraft autopilot status (left and right) transitioned from engaged to not engaged. Radio altitude right was 462 ft, computed airspeed right was 134 kts, magnetic heading right was 91 deg. Lateral and vertical deviations were 0.00 dots and 0.00 dots, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 14:18:59 CDTFDRlandingp.5
    The main landing gear and nose gear weight on wheel (WOW) sensors changed from 'air' to 'ground' at the same exact time. The ground spoilers were deployed and remained deployed.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 14:19:00 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Ground speed was 109 kts, and magnetic heading left was 92 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 14:19:01 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Computed airspeed right was 113 kts, and magnetic heading left was 90 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 14:19:02 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    The engine thrust reversers were unlocked. Ground speed was 107 kts, and magnetic heading left was 88 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 14:19:03 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    The engine thrust reversers were deployed and remained deployed. Computed airspeed right was 110 kts, and magnetic heading left was 87 deg. The captain left brake pedal was applied for one second.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 14:19:04 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Ground speed was 105 kts, and magnetic heading left was 88 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  13. 14:19:05 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Computed airspeed right was 103 kts, and magnetic heading right was 89 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 14:19:06 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Ground speed was 94 kts, and magnetic heading left was 89 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  15. 14:19:07 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Computed airspeed right was 94 kts, and magnetic heading right was 89 deg. The captain applied left brake pedal.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  16. 14:19:08 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.5
    Ground speed was 81 kts, and magnetic heading left was 89 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 14:19:09 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Computed airspeed right was 82 kts, and magnetic heading right was 89 deg. The captain right brake pedal was applied.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  18. 14:19:10 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Ground speed was 71 kts, and the magnetic heading left was 89 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  19. 14:19:11 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Computed airspeed right was 71 kts, and magnetic heading right was 91 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  20. 14:19:12 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Ground speed was 64 kts, and magnetic heading left was 95 deg. The captain right brake pedal was not applied.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  21. 14:19:13 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Computed airspeed right was 63 kts, and magnetic heading right was 100 deg. The captain left brake pedal was not applied.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  22. 14:19:14 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    Ground speed was 61 kts, and magnetic heading right was 104 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  23. 14:19:26 CDTFDRlanding rolloutp.6
    The ground speed was 0 kts, and magnetic heading left was 133 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  24. 15:10:00 CDTFDRpost-landingp.6
    The last recorded time sample.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 24 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-landing roll: Runway excursion

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA23LA0052022-10-05no fatalitiesmatch 81
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC
    Dayton, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › (general)
    Runway excursion
  • CEN11IA2342011-03-18no fatalitiesmatch 55
    EMBRAER EMB-145XR · Express Jet
    Akron, OH
    Runway excursion
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11substantialmatch 52
    Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    Chicago, IL
    Runway excursion
  • DCA19LA1342019-04-11substantialmatch 52
    Airbus A321 · American Airlines
    New York, NY
    Runway excursion
  • DCA15FA0852015-03-05substantialmatch 47
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air Lines
    New York, NY
    Runway excursion
  • ANC19LA0452019-08-01substantialmatch 46
    DOUGLAS C 118A · Tatonduk Outfitters Limited
    Buckland, AK
    Runway excursion
  • DCA09MA0212008-12-21substantialmatch 45
    BOEING 737-524 · CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC
    Denver, CO
    Runway excursion
  • DCA08MA0982008-09-204 fatalmatch 44
    Learjet LR60 · Global Exec Avaition
    Columbia, SC
    Runway excursion

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 8 of 8Runway excursion
  • 3 of 8Loss of control on ground
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • —
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA23LA0052022-10-05 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC
    The airplane’s right turn, which developed during the landing rollout and persisted until the airplane came to rest, for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence. Contributing to the incident was the pilot’s reliance primarily on differential braking, rather than sufficient and sustained opposing rudder pedal, when attempting to arrest the turn.
  • CEN11IA2342011-03-18 · EMBRAER EMB-145XR · Express Jet
    The uncommanded left deflection of the airplane's nosewheel for reasons that could not be determined because postincident examination of the nosewheel steering system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11 · Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    The flight crew’s inability to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline after touchdown due to the reduced braking action resulting from the deteriorating weather conditions, which caused the airplane’s departure from the runway surface. Contributing to the accident were the delay in performing the runway assessment for undetermined reasons and failure to close the runway. Also contributing to the accident was the controller’s failure to advise the accident flight crew that braking action was no longer cons…
  • DCA19LA1342019-04-11 · Airbus A321 · American Airlines
    The captain’s excessive left rudder pedal input during the takeoff ground roll, which caused a large heading deviation and a left roll upon rotation that resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground.  
  • DCA15FA0852015-03-05 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air Lines
    the captain's inability to maintain directional control of the airplane due to his application of excessive reverse thrust, which degraded the effectiveness of the rudder in controlling the airplane's heading. Contributing to the accident were the captain's (1) situational stress resulting from his concerns about stopping performance and (2) attentional limitations due to the high workload during the landing, which prevented him from immediately recognizing the use of excessive reverse thrust.
What it recommended after them
  • A-16-020TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with Boeing and US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) conduct a study to examine reverse thrust engine pressure ratio (EPR)-related operational data, procedures, and training and (… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-16-021TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Encourage US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) implement the best practices identified in Safety Recommendation A-16-20 and (2) participate in an industry-wide monitoring program to verify th… · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
  • A-16-022TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of MD-80 series airplanes to revise operational procedures to include a callout when reverse thrust power exceeds 1.3 engine pressure ratio during landings on a contaminated runway. · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
  • A-16-023TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Continue to work with industry to develop the technology to outfit transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability re… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-16-024TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If the systems described in Safety Recommendation A-16-23 are shown to be technically and operationally feasible, work with operators and the system manufacturers to develop procedures that ensure tha… · DCA15FA085Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-16-025TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators to provide (1) guidance that instructs flight attendants to remain at their assigned exits and actively monitor exit availability in all non-n… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-16-026TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop best practices related to evacuation communication, coordination, and decision-making during emergencies through the establishment of an industry working group and then issue guidance for 14 C… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-16-027TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Clarify guidance to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers to reinforce the importance of (1) having precise information about the number of passengers aboard an airplane, including… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).