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AIRBUS A320-232JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

11
timed facts
8
precedents
36
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

11 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 11:56:30 to 11:58:00FDRTakeoffp.5
    Airplane's takeoff from Yampa Valley Regional Airport (HDN) plotted in Figure 1
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 11:57:17FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Left (PF) sidestick transitioned from forward (nose-down) deflection to rearward (nose-up) deflection
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 11:57:21FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Left (PF) sidestick continued rearward (nose-up) deflection to a maximum of about 6 deg
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 11:57:22FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Left (PF) sidestick returned to a neutral position
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 11:57:22FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Nose landing gear indicated not compressed for one second
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 11:57:23FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Left (PF) sidestick again deflected rearward (nose-up); pitch began to increase
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 11:57:26FDRTakeoff rollp.5
    Vertical acceleration reached 1.15g, the peak for the duration of the takeoff roll
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 11:57:29FDRLiftoffp.5
    All three landing gears indicated not compressed and radio altitude began to increase
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 11:57:31FDRInitial climbp.5
    Left (PF) sidestick began to deflect to the right; roll indicated positive (right roll) shortly thereafter
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 11:57:43FDRClimbp.6
    As the airplane continued to climb, TCAS indicated traffic advisory (TA) most dangerous
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 12:32:24FDREnd of recordingp.6
    The data in the FDR file ended before the airplane landed at DEN
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • Takeoff roll (unspecified start)Left (PF) sidestick indicated forward (nose-down) deflection as airplane accelerated down runway at HDN; no deflection of right (PM) sidestick in any direction
  • unspecifiedThe data show the airplane continued to climb to an altitude of 38,000 feet MSL
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 13 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff: Tailstrike

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 65
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31substantialmatch 64
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25substantialmatch 64
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Denver, CO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA26LA1152026-02-09substantialmatch 59
    AIRBUS A321-271NX · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    San Francisco, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA25LA2862025-07-14substantialmatch 57
    EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE ERJ 170-200 LR · Republic Airways
    Boston, MA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA14CA0342014-01-04substantialmatch 56
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA23LA2322023-03-24substantialmatch 48
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD-88 · USA JET AIRLINES INC
    Saltillo, OF
    Tailstrike
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11substantialmatch 47
    Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 7 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Experience/knowledge › Knowledge
  • Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    an inadvertent loss of airspeed and increased pitch attitude prior to touchdown.
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    the flight crews failure to perform a takeoff performance data briefing following the final entries into the Flight Management System, which would have alerted them to the incorrect weight entry and resulting incorrect landing speeds. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crew to recognize and respond to various visual cues indicating the airplane's airspeed was too slow, resulting in a higher than normal pitch during landing and the tail of the airplane striking the runway.
  • DCA26LA1152026-02-09 · AIRBUS A321-271NX · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    The first officer’s excessive aft sidestick input combined with decaying airspeed during initiation of a go-around, resulting in an increase in the airplane pitch attitude and subsequent lower fuselage contacting the runway.
  • DCA25LA2862025-07-14 · EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE ERJ 170-200 LR · Republic Airways
    The captain’s decision to continue the landing after the bounce and the subsequent misapplication of pitch controls. Contributing to the accident was the ongoing “land and hold short” operations that may have created an urgency to land.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).