Cases › DCA20LA107 › The analyst
BOEING 737Swift Air LLC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
2
timed facts
8
precedents
9
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
2 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 15:14:38 PDTFDRTakeoffp.2Aircraft took off from Victorville Airport (VCV), Victorville, Californiasee the traces at this moment ↗
- 15:55:38 PDTFDRLandingp.2Aircraft landed at San Diego International Airport (SAN), San Diego, Californiasee the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 2 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Initial climb: Part(s) separation from AC
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 202 · Champlain Enterprises, LLCDulles, VA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- Boeing 737 · United AirlinesFort Meyers, FL
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- Boeing 757-200 · US AIRWAYS INCRichmond, VA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOEING 737 · Southwest AirlinesSan Francisco, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INCBaton Rouge, LA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATIONPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOEING 717-200 · Delta Air Lines IncCharlotte, NC
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air LinesJackson, WY
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenancecited here too
- 3 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Occurrences it coded
- 4 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
- 3 of 8Landing gear not configured
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Task performance › Maintenance
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA16CA2262016-09-24 · BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 202 · Champlain Enterprises, LLC
incorrect installation of the frangible towing fuse that prevented the nose landing gear from extending.
- DCA19CA1372019-04-12 · Boeing 737 · United Airlines
missing attach screws on the aft galley oven, which allowed it to become dislodged landing, injuring a flight attendant.
- DCA08IA0482008-03-22 · Boeing 757-200 · US AIRWAYS INC
The installed wing panel clips failed due to fatigue, likely caused by the incorrect installation of the fasteners in response to SB 757-57-0027. Contributing to the incorrect installation was the SB's lack of clarity in the instructions and figures on the correct orientation of the clips and spacers.
- ENG11IA0112010-12-25 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
The probable cause of the undercowl in-flight engine fire was the insufficient installation torque of the bolts that secure the fuel manifold cover to the fuel manifold. Engine vibrations and fuel pressure cycles caused the bolts to gradually loosen further until one bolt lost all its tightening torque and fell out. The internal fuel pressure then forced open the fuel manifold cover at the location of the missing bolt, causing a gap between the two mating surfaces which allowed fuel to push past the integral packi…
- CEN11IA6152011-09-01 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC
The improperly installed upper attachment bolt in the left main landing gear uplock assembly, which led to the failure of the left main landing gear to extend before landing. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel's lack of training on the installation and inspection of the uplock assembly.
What it recommended after them
- A-08-022TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of Boeing 757 airplanes to conduct a one-time visual inspection of the upper wing fixed trailing edge panel support beam clips for cracks, proper orientation, and spacers, and to rep… · DCA08IA048Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-023TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators to report any cracked clips found during the one-time inspection, as requested in Safety Recommendation A-08-22, as well as the part number and orientation of the clips relative to t… · DCA08IA048Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-024TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Boeing to issue more explicit instructions and figures that clearly illustrate the correct orientation of the clips and spacers that attach the Boeing 757 panel support beam to the wing rear s… · DCA08IA048Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
- A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).