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AIRBUS A320 - 214US AIRWAYS INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

58
timed facts
8
precedents
42
passages to ask

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One timeline

58 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 17:46:09.1CVR PA-3p.7
    “[flight attendant announcement regarding stowage of baggage and personal items related to a full flight.]”
    read in context ↗
  2. 17:51:13.9CVR PA-1calloutp.8
    “ladies and gentlemen from the uh flight deck we’d like to take a moment to welcome you aboard US Airways flight seventeen oh two service down to Fort Lauderdale. we’ll be uh pushing off the gate here in just a few more minutes. and uh taxiing out to runway two seven left here in Philadelphia for our departure. uh once airborne this afternoon its gonna’ be about two hours and fifteen minutes from uh take-off to touchdown. uh a little windy here in the Philadelphia area so uh we’re expecting a rather bumpy ride for the first uh five er to eight thousand feet. it should go by pretty quickly and then uh once we do climb up and get closer to our cruising altitude it should be a pretty nice flight down to uh Fort Lauderdale. [describes route of flight along eastern seaboard and Florida]. [describes weather in Fort Lauderdale]. uh we have been issued a uh wheels up time of uh six twenty nine going to Fort Lauderdale. [explains reason for wheels up is related to construction at Fort Lauderdale airport.] so our uh time is six twenty nine so we’ll head on out to the runway and wait uh. been talking with our uh company and they’re stickin’ pretty much uh air traffic control is stickin’ to that departure time. so uh just a few minutes late uh to get in the air but hopefully uh we can make some of that time up enroute. welcome on board. [during his PA, captain was not recorded on the HOT channels.]”
    read in context ↗
  3. 18:21:52.1CVR HOT-2calloutp.24
    “take-off data verify. one fifty seven. one fifty nine. one fifty nine. and * [Tower transmission obscures end of utterance].”
    read in context ↗
  4. 18:22:34.8CVR HOT-1p.26
    “thirty two point nine. zero.”
    read in context ↗
  5. 18:22:37.2 EDTFDRtaxi/pre-takeoffp.4
    line up and wait two seven left. Cactus seventeen zero two. (RDO-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 18:22:37.2CVR RDO-2p.26
    “line up and wait two seven left. Cactus seventeen zero two.”
    read in context ↗
  7. 18:22:47.4CVR HOT-1p.26
    “take-off signs blue. status checked.”
    read in context ↗
  8. 18:22:49.4 EDTFDRtaxi/pre-takeoffp.4
    taxi checklist to the line complete. runway and FMS verify runway two seven left. (HOT-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 18:22:49.4CVR HOT-2p.26
    “taxi checklist to the line complete. runway and FMS verify runway two seven left.”
    read in context ↗
  10. 18:22:57.7CVR HOT-1p.27
    “that’s what. (s* to) here. two seven right.”
    read in context ↗
  11. 18:23:00.2 EDTFDRtaxi/pre-takeoffp.4
    we've gotta put the different runway in (HOT-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 18:23:00.2CVR HOT-2p.27
    “ttthh...we’ve gotta put the different runway in.”
    read in context ↗
  13. 18:23:13.1CVR HOT-2calloutp.27
    “ah. take-off min fuel verify twenty two eight required. anddd. twenty four four on board.”
    read in context ↗
  14. 18:23:22.1CVR HOT-2p.27
    “flight attendants notified. engine mode is normal. TCAS is T-A-R-A. taxi checklist is---”
    read in context ↗
  15. 18:23:24.6 EDTFDRpre-takeoff clearancep.4
    Cactus seventeen zero two fly heading two three zero. runway two seven left clear for take-off. (TWR)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  16. 18:23:24.6CVR TWRp.28
    “Cactus seventeen zero two fly heading two three zero. runway two seven left clear for take-off.”
    read in context ↗
  17. 18:23:28.3CVR HOT-1p.28
    “#.”
    read in context ↗
  18. 18:23:29.0 EDTFDRpre-takeoff clearancep.4
    two tree zero and cleared for take-off. Cactus seventeen zero two. (RDO-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  19. 18:23:29.0CVR RDO-2p.28
    “two tree zero and cleared for take-off. Cactus seventeen zero two.”
    read in context ↗
  20. 18:23:43.4 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    flex (HOT-1)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  21. 18:23:43.4CVR HOT-1p.29
    “flex.”
    read in context ↗
  22. 18:23:45.0CVR HOT-2p.29
    “annnd flex set.”
    read in context ↗
  23. 18:23:46.9 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    sound of single chime, similar to level two caution (HOT)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  24. 18:23:47.6CVR HOT-1p.29
    “#.”
    read in context ↗
  25. 18:23:49.8 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    engine thrust levers not set. (HOT-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  26. 18:23:49.8CVR HOT-2p.29
    “engine thrust levers not set.”
    read in context ↗
  27. 18:23:52.8 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    they're set. (HOT-1)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  28. 18:23:52.8CVR HOT-1p.29
    “they’re set.”
    read in context ↗
  29. ~18:23:54 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.3
    Both engine TLAs drop briefly to 28 degrees before returning to 33 degrees
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  30. 18:23:54.3 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    retard - automated warning begins and continues until first impact (FWC)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  31. 18:23:54.3CVR FWCp.29
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  32. 18:23:55.5CVR FWCp.29
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  33. 18:23:55.7 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    what did you do? you didn't load. we lost everything. (HOT-1)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  34. 18:23:55.7CVR HOT-1p.30
    “what did you do? you didn’t load. we lost everything.”
    read in context ↗
  35. 18:24:00.4 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    (no) (HOT-2)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  36. 18:24:00.4CVR HOT-2p.30
    “(no).”
    read in context ↗
  37. 18:24:00.7CVR FWCp.30
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  38. 18:24:03.1 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.4
    we'll get that straight when we get airborne. (HOT-1)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  39. 18:24:03.1CVR HOT-1p.30
    “we’ll get that straight when we get airborne.”
    read in context ↗
  40. 18:24:03.3CVR FWCp.30
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  41. 18:24:09.2CVR HOT-2p.31
    “wh*. I’m sorry.”
    read in context ↗
  42. 18:24:09.7CVR FWCp.31
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  43. 18:24:10 EDTFDRrotation/liftoffp.4
    Nose gear weight on wheels (WOW) transitions to 'In air' for 4 seconds; aircraft reached airspeed of 173 knots and maximum nose-up pitch attitude of 6 degrees
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  44. 18:24:11.7CVR TWRwarningp.31
    “Brickyard thirty two ninety seven runway two seven left. fly runway [transmission obscured by sound of impact of USAir 1702] cleared for take-off.”
    read in context ↗
  45. 18:24:12.9CVR FWCp.31
    “retard.”
    read in context ↗
  46. 18:24:13.8CVR HOTwarningp.31
    “[sound of first impact]”
    read in context ↗
  47. 18:24:14 EDTFDRimpactp.4
    Aircraft pitches down followed by a 3.76g spike in vertical acceleration; consistent with impact
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  48. 18:24:15.2CVR HOT-1p.32
    “oh #.”
    read in context ↗
  49. 18:24:16.4CVR RPAcalloutp.32
    “3297 two seven left runway heading cleared for take-off. Brickyard thirty two ninety seven.”
    read in context ↗
  50. 18:24:18.7CVR HOTfinal secondsp.32
    “[sound of second impact]”
    read in context ↗
  51. 18:24:19.5CVR TWRfinal secondsp.32
    “(Brickyard) [transmission obscured by sound of impact of USAirways 1702] runway two seven left line up and wait.”
    read in context ↗
  52. 18:24:19.9CVR HOTfinal secondsp.32
    “[sound of third impact]”
    read in context ↗
  53. 18:24:22.2CVR ACfinal secondsp.32
    “obscured by sound of impact of USAirways 1702] .”
    read in context ↗
  54. 18:24:23.7CVR HOTfinal secondsp.32
    “[sound of repetitive chime, similar to Continuous Repetitive Chime (3.0 seconds)]”
    read in context ↗
  55. 18:24:27.4CVR HOTfinal secondsp.33
    “[sound of repetitive chime, similar to Continuous Repetitive Chime, continues until end of recording]”
    read in context ↗
  56. 18:24:29.1CVR HOTfinal secondsp.33
    “[sound similar to power interruption to CVR]”
    read in context ↗
  57. 18:24:31 EDTFDRend of recordingp.4
    The recording ended
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  58. 18:24:31.8CVR HOTfinal secondsp.33
    “[sound similar to power interruption to CVR]”
    read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 17 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5Cockpit Voice Recorder- Group Chairman's Factual Report · 41 of 251 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Abnormal runway contact→
  2. Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Landing gear collapse

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 68
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25substantialmatch 60
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Denver, CO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA14FA0022013-10-23substantialmatch 60
    BEECH 1900C · ERA AVIATION INC
    Homer, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Landing gear collapse
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11substantialmatch 59
    Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 59
    BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA25LA1632025-03-20no fatalitiesmatch 57
    BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Orlando, FL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA16LA1002016-02-24substantialmatch 57
    EMBRAER EMB145 · TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
    St Louis, MO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11no fatalitiesmatch 56
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 2 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Navigation system
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    the flight crews failure to perform a takeoff performance data briefing following the final entries into the Flight Management System, which would have alerted them to the incorrect weight entry and resulting incorrect landing speeds. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crew to recognize and respond to various visual cues indicating the airplane's airspeed was too slow, resulting in a higher than normal pitch during landing and the tail of the airplane striking the runway.
  • DCA14FA0022013-10-23 · BEECH 1900C · ERA AVIATION INC
    The first officer inadvertently selecting the landing gear handle up after touchdown during the landing rollout. Contributing to the accident was the first officer's decision to reconfigure the airplane while still on the active runway.
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11 · Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    The flight crew’s inability to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline after touchdown due to the reduced braking action resulting from the deteriorating weather conditions, which caused the airplane’s departure from the runway surface. Contributing to the accident were the delay in performing the runway assessment for undetermined reasons and failure to close the runway. Also contributing to the accident was the controller’s failure to advise the accident flight crew that braking action was no longer cons…
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29 · BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    The flight crewmembers’ failure to properly monitor the airplane’s flightpath, which caused the approach to become unstabilized and resulted in the airplane’s descent below the decision altitude while misaligned with the localizer course. Contributing to the incident were the first officer’s delay in setting go-around thrust after the captain called for the go-around and the captain’s failure to take control of the airplane after go-around thrust was not immediately set, both of which caused the airplane to come wi…

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).