FlarePath
Cases › DCA14CA161 › The analyst

BOEING 757 223AMERICAN AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

4
timed facts
8
precedents
14
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
Try

Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

4 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. about 18:07 EDTFDRtakeoffp.3
    Aircraft took off and climbed to a pressure altitude of 40,000 ft
  2. 20:23 EDTFDRapproachp.3
    Aircraft descending out of 3,000 ft on a magnetic heading of around 90 degrees; winds consistent from about 90 degrees true at 11 knots; autopilot engaged, transitioning from altitude hold to approach glideslope mode
  3. 20:26:56 EDTFDRlandingp.3
    Gear weight-on-wheels signal went true, indicative of landing; control column angle increased to 7 degrees and elevators reached a peak of 17 degrees at touchdown
  4. about 20:26:58 EDTFDRlandingp.3
    Pitch followed the column input and increased to a peak of 11 degrees for about a second, two seconds after touchdown, before reducing to zero (tail strike)
Recorder events without a clock time
  • cruiseCruised at 40,000 ft on a heading of around 305 degrees for about 1 hour 30 minutes, then descended to about 12,000 ft for about 5 minutes and stepped down to 3,000 ft where it made a right turn onto the runway heading
  • passing about 2,250 ftAutopilot disconnected; flight director continued to provide glideslope guidance
  • crossing about 700 ft AGLStabilizer position, having stepped down several times during the final descent, stayed constant at -5 degrees from this point
  • rolloutAfter thrust reverser deployment, the number 1 engine took five seconds longer than the number 2 engine to accelerate to its commanded reverse thrust; engines otherwise followed command inputs with symmetric thrust during the approach
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 8 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-flare/touchdown: Abnormal runway contact

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30substantialmatch 62
    BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    San Diego, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA17LA1222017-05-21substantialmatch 62
    BOEING 757 · Delta Air Lines
    Raleigh, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA18CA2832018-08-13substantialmatch 62
    AIRBUS A321-271N · Hawaiian Airlines Inc
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA14CA0342014-01-04substantialmatch 61
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA13CA0652013-03-08substantialmatch 58
    BOEING 757-232 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA24LA0652024-01-10substantialmatch 58
    BOEING 737 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA13FA0712013-04-05substantialmatch 56
    AIRBUS 321 · U.A Airways Inc
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA17LA1452017-06-23substantialmatch 56
    AIRBUS A321 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 7 of 8Tailstrike
  • 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30 · BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    the first officer's failure to maintain the correct airspeed and pitch attitude during landing that resulted in a tailstrike.
  • DCA17LA1222017-05-21 · BOEING 757 · Delta Air Lines
    the first officer's failure to attain a proper landing flare, which resulted in a tail strike.
  • DCA18CA2832018-08-13 · AIRBUS A321-271N · Hawaiian Airlines Inc
    a tailstrike caused by inappropriate recovery technique after a bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the radio altimeter, caused by the approach being over calm/flat water, that was not recognized by the flight crew.
  • DCA14CA0342014-01-04 · BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    the captain's over rotation during the bounced landing.
  • DCA13CA0652013-03-08 · BOEING 757-232 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    the pilot's failure to maintain correct airspeed and pitch attitude at touchdown.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).