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BOMBARDIER DHC8Piedmont Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

11
timed facts
8
precedents
6
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

11 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 00:04:42 EDT (May 18)FDRapproachp.3
    After holding about 2,800 ft, the aircraft began descending for another approach
  2. 00:12:21 EDTFDRgo-aroundp.3
    Second go-around: pitched up to 11 degrees and climbed back to about 2,800 ft
  3. 00:32:20 EDTFDRholdingp.3
    First vertical g maneuver reaching 1.6 g (attempt to lower the left main gear)
  4. 00:32:52 EDTFDRholdingp.3
    Second vertical g maneuver reaching 1.4 g
  5. 00:57:58 EDTFDRapproachp.3
    Aircraft began the landing descent from 2,600 ft
  6. 01:01:51 EDTFDRlandingp.3
    During the gear-up landing, high excitations in the accelerations began to build; airspeed dropped from about 81 knots to a final value of 58 knots
  7. 01:02:03 EDTFDRlandingp.3
    Power removed from the FDR
  8. 23:05:22 EDT (May 17)FDRtakeoffp.3
    Takeoff
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 23:12:38 EDTFDRcruisep.3
    Aircraft leveled at an average pressure altitude of 6,800 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 23:27:42 EDTFDRdescentp.3
    Descent to land began
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 23:30:52 EDTFDRgo-aroundp.3
    Go-around on final approach, pitching to 9 degrees and climbing to a pressure altitude of 2,800 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER 10-FACTUAL REPORT · 11 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)→
  2. Landing-landing roll: Abnormal runway contact

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA17MA0222016-10-28substantialmatch 77
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 10-10F · FedEx Express
    Fort Lauderdale, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
  • ENG12IA0242012-03-13no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes Aviation
    Hays, KS
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG12IA0132011-12-03no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BEECH 1900D · GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD
    Denver International Airport, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG12IA0142012-02-17no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes Airlines
    Denver International Airport, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14no fatalitiesmatch 70
    BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05substantialmatch 69
    BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Chattanooga, TN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Abnormal runway contact
  • CEN11IA3792011-06-07no fatalitiesmatch 68
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 3 of 8Aircraft inspection event
  • 2 of 8Landing gear not configured
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • Management › Policy/procedure
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA17MA0222016-10-28 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 10-10F · FedEx Express
    The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a corrosion pit. The pit formed in the absence of a required protective cadmium coating the cause of which could not be determined from available evidence. Contributing to the failure of the left MLG was the operator's overhaul limit, which exceeded that recommended by the airplane manufacturer without sufficient data and analysis to ensure crack detection before it progressed to failure.
  • ENG12IA0242012-03-13 · BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes Aviation
    A failure of the nose landing gear end cap due to fatigue. Contributing to the failure were the ineffective inspection and the unknown effect of grain direction on fatigue life.
  • ENG12IA0132011-12-03 · BEECH 1900D · GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD
    A failure of the nose landing gear end cap due to fatigue. Contributing to the failure were the ineffective inspection and the unknown effect of grain direction on fatigue life.
  • ENG12IA0142012-02-17 · BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes Airlines
    A failure of the nose landing gear end cap due to fatigue. Contributing to the failure were the ineffective inspection and the unknown effect of grain direction on fatigue life.
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally and manually for reasons that could not be conclusively determined.
What it recommended after them
  • A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-25-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to inspect the bannis latches on Boeing 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplane doors and, if necessary, modify or replace them so they comply with the correct confi… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to inspect and, if necessary, modify or rep… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to update their Boeing 757 200, 200CB, and -300 series airplane aircraft maintenance manuals (AMM) in accordance with the revised Boeing AMM and illustrated parts cat… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to update their aircraft maintenance manual… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-007TO BOEING: Once the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual and illustrated parts catalog are updated to provide a consistent and accurate depiction of the bannis latch assembly, issue a service bulletin advising Boeing 757 operators to insp… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-008TO BOEING: Issue a service bulletin advising operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757 200, 200CB, and -300 series) to inspect those airplanes and, if necessary, modify or… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).