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MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

4
timed facts
8
precedents
24
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

4 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 02:45:00 MSTFDRtakeoffp.3
    Start of plotted flight data (figures 1-6 cover the flight to the end of the recording at 05:03:18 MST); takeoff figures cover 02:47:00 to 02:50:00 MST
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 04:55:00-04:58:10 MSTFDRlandingp.3
    Landing period covered by the expanded-scale figures 7-12
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 04:56:51 MSTFDRlandingp.3
    During landing the vertical acceleration spiked at a maximum of 2.32 g; pitch angle increased to a maximum of 13.4 degrees nose up; computed airspeed approximately 122.5 knots (tail strike)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 05:03:18 MSTFDRtaxip.3
    End of recording after a normal taxi to the cargo ramp
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 4 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-flare/touchdown: Tailstrike

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31substantialmatch 94
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 93
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA14CA0342014-01-04substantialmatch 82
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05substantialmatch 82
    BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    Albuquerque, NM
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30substantialmatch 82
    BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    San Diego, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA13FA0712013-04-05substantialmatch 76
    AIRBUS 321 · U.A Airways Inc
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA25LA1632025-03-20no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Orlando, FL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11no fatalitiesmatch 71
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 6 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    an inadvertent loss of airspeed and increased pitch attitude prior to touchdown.
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
  • DCA14CA0342014-01-04 · BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    the captain's over rotation during the bounced landing.
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05 · BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    the pilot flying's failure to maintain airspeed and correct pitch attitude. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to maintain appropriate thrust after disconnecting the autothrottles. Also contributing was the first officer's failure to monitor the decaying airspeed and increasing pitch.
  • DCA14LA1372014-07-30 · BOEING 757 · United Airlines
    the first officer's failure to maintain the correct airspeed and pitch attitude during landing that resulted in a tailstrike.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).