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Cases › DCA11FA050 › The analyst

BOEING 737-823American Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

6
timed facts
8
precedents
9
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

6 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 10:33:50-11:04:50 PSTFDRclimbp.2
    Climb to a pressure altitude of 33,365 ft over the 31-minute recording
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 10:40:49 PSTFDRtakeoffp.3
    FMC V2 speed 158 knots
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 10:40:53 PSTFDRtakeoffp.3
    FMC Vr speed 153 knots
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 10:40:57 PSTFDRtakeoffp.3
    FMC V1 speed 123 knots
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 10:41:14 PSTFDRrotationp.3
    Nose gear weight-on-wheels transitioned from ground to air
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 10:41:26 PSTFDRlift-offp.3
    Maximum recorded pitch 15.3 degrees; maximum vertical acceleration around this time 1.13 g to 1.11 g (tail strike)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • takeoffTrailing edge flaps remained at 1 degree and slats 1 to 8 recorded mid-extended during the takeoff
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 7 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff: Tailstrike

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31substantialmatch 93
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25substantialmatch 93
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Denver, CO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05substantialmatch 79
    BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    Albuquerque, NM
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Tailstrike
  • DCA25LA1632025-03-20no fatalitiesmatch 76
    BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Orlando, FL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 68
    BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA14MA0812014-03-13substantialmatch 68
    AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA08FA0752008-06-14substantialmatch 67
    DOUGLAS MD-10 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Raymond, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    an inadvertent loss of airspeed and increased pitch attitude prior to touchdown.
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    the flight crews failure to perform a takeoff performance data briefing following the final entries into the Flight Management System, which would have alerted them to the incorrect weight entry and resulting incorrect landing speeds. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crew to recognize and respond to various visual cues indicating the airplane's airspeed was too slow, resulting in a higher than normal pitch during landing and the tail of the airplane striking the runway.
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05 · BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    the pilot flying's failure to maintain airspeed and correct pitch attitude. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to maintain appropriate thrust after disconnecting the autothrottles. Also contributing was the first officer's failure to monitor the decaying airspeed and increasing pitch.
  • DCA25LA1632025-03-20 · BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The captain’s failure to recognize that the airplane’s location did not agree with the assigned departure runway as required per the Southwest Airlines Airplane Operating Manual, and the captain’s plan continuation error when he missed several cues that would have informed him that he was not on the assigned departure runway when he initiated takeoff.
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Southwest Airlines flight crew’s misjudgment of the distance required to safely pass the American Airlines airplane.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).