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Cases › DCA10LA083 › The analyst

EMBRAER ERJ 170 100 SESHUTTLE AMERICA CORP

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

2
timed facts
8
precedents
8
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

2 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. about 11:33 CDTFDRcruisep.4
    Aircraft level at 29,000 ft for about 55 seconds before the alert
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. about 11:34 CDTFDRcruisep.4
    TCAS Combined Control = Climb Correction and TCAS Up Advisory = CLIMB, lasting about 11 seconds
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • +1 secondAutopilot Engaged transitioned to Not Engaged and the control column began moving aft; one second later AP Selected went to Not Selected and the column peaked at about 8 degrees aft, then moved forward to about -2 degrees a second later
  • evasive maneuverPitch oscillated from about 2 degrees before the event to 7, then 3, then 5, leveling at about 4 degrees; vertical acceleration increased to about 2.4 g, dropped to 0.5 g, then 1.25 g before settling; aircraft climbed to 29,600 ft
  • after the oscillationsTCAS Vertical Control indicated Increase for 6 seconds, ending with the other TCAS discretes
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER 10 - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT (DCA10LA083) · 5 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute-cruise: Collision avoidance alert→
  2. Enroute-change of cruise level: Abrupt maneuver→
  3. Enroute-change of cruise level: Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR10LA1342010-02-13no fatalitiesmatch 59
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Santa Clarita, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    Abrupt maneuverCollision avoidance alert
  • DCA24LA3162024-09-19no fatalitiesmatch 52
    BOEING 757-224 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Dunnigan, CA
    Abrupt maneuverNear midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation
  • CEN22FA0312021-11-134 fatalmatch 51
    BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A · MCPHILLIPS FLYING SERVICE INC
    Beaver Island, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • ANC13FA0542013-06-041 fatalmatch 51
    DEHAVILLAND BEAVER DHC-2 MK.1 · Pacific Wings LLC
    Petersburg, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    Abrupt maneuver
  • ERA10LA0412009-10-26no fatalitiesmatch 50
    BOEING 717-200 · Air Tran Airways
    Pleasant Grove, NC
    Abrupt maneuverCollision avoidance alert
  • CEN10MA0882010-01-052 fatalmatch 49
    GATES LEARJET CORP. 35A · ROYAL AIR FREIGHT INC
    Prospect Heights, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • ANC10FA0142010-01-222 fatalmatch 47
    BEECH 1900C · Alaska Central Express, Inc.
    Sand Point, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • DCA23LA3952023-07-23no fatalitiesmatch 47
    AIRBUS A320-214 · Allegiant Air, LLC
    Fort Lauderdale, FL
    Abrupt maneuverNear midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Abrupt maneuver
  • 3 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
  • 3 of 8Loss of control in flight
  • 2 of 8Collision avoidance alert
  • 2 of 8Near midair/TCAS alert/loss of separation
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Not determined › (general)
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR10LA1342010-02-13 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The pilot’s abrupt airplane pitch change maneuver. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to maintain the heading specified by the air traffic controller, which would have avoided the near collision course with an unidentified airplane that triggered the traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory.
  • DCA24LA3162024-09-19 · BOEING 757-224 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The abrupt pitch control input by the flight crew in response to a TCAS resolution advisory resulted in two serious passenger injuries.
  • CEN22FA0312021-11-13 · BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A · MCPHILLIPS FLYING SERVICE INC
    The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during final approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control at an altitude too low to recover.
  • ANC13FA0542013-06-04 · DEHAVILLAND BEAVER DHC-2 MK.1 · Pacific Wings LLC
    The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate altitude above the trees, and his subsequent failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering to avoid the trees, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall/spin and an uncontrolled descent.
  • ERA10LA0412009-10-26 · BOEING 717-200 · Air Tran Airways
    The captain's excessive maneuver in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) alert, which resulted in a serious injury to a flight attendant. Contributing to the accident was the operator's inadequate TCAS training and guidance.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).