Cases › DCA08FA075 › The analyst
DOUGLAS MD-10FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
0
timed facts
8
precedents
8
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
Recorder events without a clock time
- SRN 92,228 (about 1 h 40 min after takeoff)Slats L2, R2, L4 and R4 transitioned from Retracted to Transit (Near Retracted) while in about a 15-degree left roll at 33,000 ft, 206 knots computed airspeed, both engine N1 at 98%
- SRN 92,228-92,255Slats moved to Transit (Near Extended), back to Near Retracted, then Retracted; N1 decreased to a minimum of 48% then increased to about 80%; airspeed decreased to 194 knots and continued decreasing
- SRN 92,271At 186 knots both stick shakers transitioned to Warn; engine N1 had increased to about 99%
- SRN 92,283Descent from 33,000 ft to 29,000 ft began; airspeed had decreased to a minimum of 176 knots
- SRN 92,283-92,329Airspeed fluctuated around 180 knots and the stick shakers cycled to Warn a couple more times; at SRN 92,305 Slat Auto Extend commanded Extend, slats L4/R4 moved to Near Retracted, master caution and Slats Disagree activated; all reverted at SRN 92,318 as airspeed increased; slats back to Retracted at SRN 92,323
- SRN 92,329At 30,787 ft and 189 knots the stick shakers ceased and remained off for the rest of the flight
- SRN 92,475Reached 29,000 ft with airspeed increased to 243 knots
- SRN 96,647Aircraft landed, about 1 hour 9 minutes later
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 8 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
- Enroute-holding (IFR): Aerodynamic stall/spin
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BEECH 1900C · ALASKA CENTRAL EXPRESS INCAleknagik, AK
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · PSA Airlines, Inc.Bowman, GA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Aerodynamic stall/spin - DOUGLAS DC-8-62F · Air Transport International LLCYakota, JP
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOEING 737-823 · American AirlinesLos Angeles, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOEING 777 · UNITED AIRLINES INCKahului, HI
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Cessna A185 · Webster James MNuiqsut, AK
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Cessna A185Fairbanks, AK
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, IL
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decisioncited here too
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Occurrences it coded
- 2 of 8Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Action/decision › Action
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ANC13FA0302013-03-08 · BEECH 1900C · ALASKA CENTRAL EXPRESS INC
The flight crew's failure to maintain terrain clearance, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's failure to correctly read back and interpret clearance altitudes issued by the air traffic controller, their failure to adhere to minimum altitudes depicted on the published instrument approach chart, and their failure to adhere to company checklists. Also contributing to the accident were the air traffic control…
- DCA13IA0582013-02-07 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · PSA Airlines, Inc.
the captain's inappropriate climb speed, his failure to monitor airspeed during the level off, and his inappropriate response to multiple stall warnings.
- ANC11CA1012011-09-10 · DOUGLAS DC-8-62F · Air Transport International LLC
The passenger's decision to ignore the fasten seatbelt sign, resulting in serious injury to the passenger during a turbulence encounter.
- DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
- DCA23LA1722022-12-19 · BOEING 777 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
The flight crew’s failure to manage the airplane’s vertical flightpath, airspeed, and pitch attitude following a miscommunication about the captain’s desired flap setting during the initial climb.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).