FlarePath
Cases › CHI08IA292 › The analyst

BOEING 757-223American Airlines, Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

59
timed facts
8
precedents
105
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
Try

Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

59 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 09:49:00-10:00:57 CDTFDRpre-flightp.5
    Before takeoff airspeed invalid (FDAU not receiving data); main battery 28 VDC
  2. 10:00:57 CDTFDRtakeoff/climbp.5
    Takeoff roll began; climb to 37,000 ft, level at 10:24
  3. 10:20:47 CDTFDRclimbp.5
    Faults recorded for left and right main pitot heat and left AOA probe heat
  4. 10:25:35 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Main battery voltage spiked to about 31 VDC
  5. 10:30:55 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Pitot/AOA heat faults cleared; main battery indicated discharging at -24 A and voltage began decreasing (battery carrying loads - generator/bus loss)
  6. 11:43:23CVR STARTp.8
    “OF RECORDING”
    read in context ↗
  7. 11:58:06CVR CAM-2calloutp.16
    “you clicked the autopilot off didn’t you? remember you were flying. did you click it off? it didn’t come off. CHI08IA292”
    read in context ↗
  8. 12:01:52CVR HOT-2calloutp.20
    “yup remember I read it as prior to takeoff? after takeoff? one or both thrust reversers inoperative buh buh buh buh buh yeah. we got the the uh L-O-R-E-V.”
    read in context ↗
  9. 12:06:35CVR HOT-1warningp.23
    “yeah yeah that’s uh. whoops.”
    read in context ↗
  10. 12:39:32CVR CAM-1calloutp.36
    “emergency lights flickered on and off on takeoff. he said we had em when I talked to him earlier.”
    read in context ↗
  11. 12:43:09CVR HOT-2warningp.38
    “see if you can pull up ATIS.”
    read in context ↗
  12. 12:43:38CVR CAM-1warningp.39
    “yeah the Pegasus airplane is kind of funky. you you pull up the ATIS and it says ATIS here. you go to the print go to the ATIS page or hit”
    read in context ↗
  13. 12:53:28CVR CAM-3p.48
    “oh my God.”
    read in context ↗
  14. 12:53:30CVR HOT-2p.48
    “now we got now we just got this stuff here and this all this all the problems here and all the problems there. but the engines are fine. [sound of laughter]”
    read in context ↗
  15. 12:53:32 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Main battery discharge indicated normal; battery voltage 15 VDC
  16. 12:54:37-12:56:07 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Left main pitot heat fault (12:54:37), computed airspeed cycling 0-320 kts from 12:55:31, left AOA heat fault (12:55:37), right main pitot heat fault (12:56:07)
  17. 12:54:38CVR CAMwarningp.49
    “[sound similar to master caution tones]”
    read in context ↗
  18. 12:54:38CVR HOT-2p.49
    “#.”
    read in context ↗
  19. 12:54:42CVR CAM-3p.49
    “do you want me to call him?”
    read in context ↗
  20. 12:56:17CVR CAMwarningp.50
    “[sound similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  21. 12:56:21CVR CAMwarningp.50
    “[sound similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  22. 12:56:28CVR HOT-2warningp.50
    “you know um autopilot disconnected LNAV's gone. gosh darn it.”
    read in context ↗
  23. 12:56:47 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Lowest main battery voltage 5 VDC
  24. 12:56:59CVR CAM-1p.50
    “marvelous.”
    read in context ↗
  25. 12:57:32-12:57:38 CDTFDRcruisep.5
    Computed airspeed and pressure altitude invalid to the end of the recording; Air Data Computer failure recorded
  26. 12:57:32CVR HOT-2p.51
    “I didn't touch a thing. it started out one thing at a time. it started with the autothrottle disconnecting.”
    read in context ↗
  27. 12:57:35CVR CAM-1p.51
    “autopilot. it shows the degrade and I've lost my whole side here. okay and we've lost— look at this.”
    read in context ↗
  28. 12:58:00CVR HOT-2warningp.51
    “okay...yeah the autopilot went away. that was on there too. the autopilot disconnect.”
    read in context ↗
  29. 13:05:21CVR HOT-1calloutp.56
    “yeah that's true but now for example if we have a hydraulic problem we're gonna have to belly this airplane in because we can't get the gear down. you got to have the battery to get the gear down. you must. so our backup items are not not looking good. see I'm tumbled here. I'm dead over here. I'm dead meat. the baro is working here so that's looking good. these are good but none of these are good. so uh how— would you say we've been in the flight for about uh three hours?”
    read in context ↗
  30. 13:15:48CVR RDO-1calloutp.61
    “uh we're having electrical complications uh we've been watching them carefully on the way uh out of Seattle and things are getting worse. we're going to divert to O'Hare. our apologies for that but uh electrical systems continue to uh fail and we're down to uh minimum equipment right now so we're going to divert to O'Hare over.”
    read in context ↗
  31. 13:16:11CVR GSWwarningp.61
    “understand electrical problems. uh and you're diverting to O'Hare. are you declaring an emergency?”
    read in context ↗
  32. 13:17:33CVR CAMwarningp.63
    “[sound similar to master caution tones]”
    read in context ↗
  33. 13:17:43CVR HOT-2p.63
    “click the autopilot?”
    read in context ↗
  34. 13:17:45CVR CAM-1p.63
    “uh click off the autopilot a second time and that light should go out. there you go. I'm gonna talk to em. be right back.”
    read in context ↗
  35. 13:17:47 CDTFDRdescentp.5
    Descent began (from pitch and engine indications, air data being invalid)
  36. 13:18:53CVR CAMwarningp.64
    “[sound similar to master caution tones]”
    read in context ↗
  37. 13:23:07CVR RDO-1calloutp.68
    “yeah it's American two sixty eight. we got uh minimum equipment in the cockpit. we're headed two seven zero uh west. and uh descending from uh two seven zero to two four zero.”
    read in context ↗
  38. 13:25:01CVR RDO-1calloutp.70
    “uh we're down to uh kind of minimum equipment. I'm gonna say uh request uh vectors please.”
    read in context ↗
  39. 13:29:19CVR HOT-1calloutp.73
    “uhhh let's see that's...you know what I can do— you still need some more drag? ‘cause we could put the gear down now. you need you need two hundred fifty knots. well—.”
    read in context ↗
  40. 13:31:11CVR HOT-2calloutp.75
    “gear down. that'll be the flight attendants' warning.”
    read in context ↗
  41. 13:40:00CVR EGPWSwarningp.86
    “twenty five hundred.”
    read in context ↗
  42. 13:40:25CVR RDO-1warningp.87
    “American two sixty eight inbound uh we're declaring an emergency now.”
    read in context ↗
  43. 13:40:31CVR TWRwarningp.87
    “American two sixty eight understand declaring an emergency. runway two two right cleared to land winds zero seven zero at eight. full length available. crews are on stand by.”
    read in context ↗
  44. 13:41:07CVR EGPWSwarningp.87
    “one thousand.”
    read in context ↗
  45. 13:41:28CVR EGPWSwarningp.88
    “five hundred.”
    read in context ↗
  46. 13:41:30CVR EGPWSwarningp.88
    “too low gear. [repeats until touchdown]”
    read in context ↗
  47. 13:41:57CVR HOT-2p.89
    “gotta flare.”
    read in context ↗
  48. 13:41:58 CDTFDRlandingp.5
    Gear weight-on-wheels indicated ground (landing ORD 22R)
  49. 13:41:59CVR HOT-1p.89
    “looking good.”
    read in context ↗
  50. 13:42:00 CDTFDRlanding rollp.5
    FDR recording ended (recorder lost power at the air/ground transition)
  51. 13:42:02CVR HOT-2p.89
    “okay I'm on the brakes. I'm on the brakes. I'm on the brakes. I have no brakes.”
    read in context ↗
  52. 13:46:19CVR RDO-1final secondsp.93
    “okay very good. we are going to shut down the engines with the fire handles and we will lose communications with you. is that okay?”
    read in context ↗
  53. 13:46:33CVR RDO-1final secondsp.93
    “okay here we go.”
    read in context ↗
  54. 13:46:36CVR CAMfinal secondsp.93
    “[sound similar to movement of fire handles]”
    read in context ↗
  55. 13:46:37CVR HOT-1final secondsp.93
    “okay they're gonna put up some stairs.”
    read in context ↗
  56. 13:46:41CVR HOT-2final secondsp.93
    “unbelievable.”
    read in context ↗
  57. 13:46:44CVR CAMfinal secondsp.93
    “[sound similar to power interruption] CHI08IA292”
    read in context ↗
  58. 13:46:44CVR CAM-?final secondsp.94
    “okay.”
    read in context ↗
  59. 13:46:45CVR CAMfinal secondsp.94
    “[sound similar to engine spooldown]”
    read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 12 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 47 of 944 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute: Electrical system malf/failure→
  2. Landing-landing roll: Off-field or emergency landing→
  3. Landing-landing roll: Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR13LA0452012-11-181 fatalmatch 54
    PIPER PA-32 · Star Marianas Air, Inc
    Obyan, USA
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) Off-field or emergency landing
  • DCA08IA0332008-01-25no fatalitiesmatch 52
    Airbus A320 · United Airlines Inc
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11no fatalitiesmatch 49
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Greer, SC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA21FA1742021-07-02destroyedmatch 47
    BOEING 737-275C · RHOADES AVIATION INC
    Honolulu, HI
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA14MA0812014-03-13substantialmatch 46
    AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • OPS10IA0012009-10-19no fatalitiesmatch 46
    BOEING 767 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.
    Atlanta Hartsfield Intl. Apt. (KATL), GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • ERA24FA1102024-02-092 fatalmatch 45
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B16 · Ace Aviation Services
    Naples, FL
    • ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
    Off-field or emergency landing
  • NYC03FA0672003-03-27no fatalitiesmatch 45
    Boeing 717-200 · Air Tran Airways
    Flushing, NY
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 7 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Loss of engine power (partial)
  • 2 of 8Off-field or emergency landing
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • Management › Policy/procedure
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Development › Manufacture/production
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
  • Action/decision › Action

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR13LA0452012-11-18 · PIPER PA-32 · Star Marianas Air, Inc
    A partial loss of engine power shortly after takeoff for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation and the pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during the unsuccessful attempt to return for landing on the airport. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to conduct his second takeoff using less than the full runway length available and the airline’s lack of guidance regarding how to respond to en…
  • DCA08IA0332008-01-25 · Airbus A320 · United Airlines Inc
    a fault in the airplane's AC 1 electrical bus that caused a number of other electrical busses on the aircraft to lose power.
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The overheating and arcing of the DC Ground Service Relay and Block Diodes component for undetermined reasons.
  • DCA21FA1742021-07-02 · BOEING 737-275C · RHOADES AVIATION INC
    The flight crewmembers’ misidentification of the damaged engine (after leveling off the airplane and reducing thrust) and their use of only the damaged engine for thrust during the remainder of the flight, resulting in an unintentional descent and forced ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s ineffective crew resource management, high workload, and stress.
  • DCA14MA0812014-03-13 · AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
    the captain's decision to reject the takeoff after the airplane had rotated. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to follow standard operating procedures by not verifying that the airplane's flight management computer was properly configured for takeoff and the captain's failure to perform the correct action in response to the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring alert.
What it recommended after them
  • A-08-053TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Airbus A320 family aircraft to modify these aircraft in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120 to provide the automatic reconfiguration of the AC essential bus p… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-054TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Airbus to develop a modification for in-service A320 family aircraft such that, in the event of an AC 1 electrical bus failure, the standby attitude indicator is powered by an additional power… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-055TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of A320 family aircraft to develop new procedures, if necessary, and to provide flight crews with guidance and simulator training regarding the symptoms and resolution procedures… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-08-056TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require all operators of Airbus A320 family aircraft to modify these aircraft in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120 to provide the automatic reconfiguration of the AC essential bus p… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-057TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require Airbus to develop a modification for in-service A320 family aircraft such that, in the event of an AC 1 electrical bus failure, the standby attitude indicator is powered by an additional power… · DCA08IA033Closed - Reconsidered
  • A-08-058TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require all operators of A320 aircraft to develop new procedures, if necessary, and to provide flight crews with guidance and simulator training regarding the symptoms and resolution procedures for th… · DCA08IA033Closed--No Longer Applicable
  • A-11-012TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Perform a technical review of Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X (ASDE-X) to determine if the capability exists systemwide to detect improper operations such as landings on taxiways. · OPS10IA001Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-11-013tO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: At those installation sites where the technical review recommended in Safety Recommendation A-11-12 determines it is feasible, implement modifications to Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X (A… · OPS10IA001Closed - Unacceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).