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Cases › CHI08IA182 › The analyst

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-81Midwest Airlines, Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
15
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • takeoff roll to about 12,000 ft (plots 3-4)Takeoff and initial climb covering the suspected tail-slide deployment window: maximum pitch during initial rotation 16.3 deg with a maximum pitch rate 3.5 deg/s and average 1.4 deg/s; maximum pitch during takeoff and initial climb 26.8 deg at SRN 361267
  • climbAutopilot disconnected in the climb (plot 1 shows AP status for the whole flight) when heavier elevator forces were felt; diversion to St Louis
  • SRN 361,263.797-361,264.547 (incident takeoff)Load-factor conditions at the slide-cover hinge satisfied the tip criterion (nx)h*zcg > (nlf)h*xcg for a sustained 0.75 s during rotation/initial climb - long enough for an unsecured cover to rotate and pull the inflation lanyard
  • 8th previous flight, SRN ~295,200-295,250Tip condition met only for four isolated samples, not a sustained event
  • 9th previous flight, SRN ~290,550-290,570Tip condition met for a single sample
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 2 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Study Report · 3 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Prior to flight: Aircraft inspection event→
  2. Takeoff: Cabin safety event→
  3. Initial climb: Flight control sys malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA15FA0732015-02-24no fatalitiesmatch 63
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 11F · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    St. Louis, MO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings
  • ANC14CA0122013-11-25substantialmatch 56
    DOUGLAS DC-6 · TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD
    Nuiqsut, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings
  • CEN10LA2402010-04-30no fatalitiesmatch 50
    BOEING 767 · American Airlines
    Fort Dodge, IA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings
  • DCA03IA0582003-09-25no fatalitiesmatch 49
    McDonnell Douglas MD-80 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    DFW, TX
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08substantialmatch 47
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    Ypsilanti, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA25LA0152024-10-29substantialmatch 47
    AIRBUS A300 F4-622R · United Parcel Service Co
    Louisville, KY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • CEN09IA2942009-05-13no fatalitiesmatch 46
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Houston, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • CEN10IA1572010-03-13no fatalitiesmatch 46
    EMBRAER EMB-145LR · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    Chicago, IL
    Flight control sys malf/fail

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 7 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 2 of 8Evacuation
  • 2 of 8Miscellaneous/other
  • 2 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft systems › Flight control system
  • Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA15FA0732015-02-24 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 11F · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    a partial inflation of the 1L escape slide/raft due to undetermined reasons resulting in insufficient capability to support the weight of the crewmember.
  • ANC14CA0122013-11-25 · DOUGLAS DC-6 · TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD
    A load shift during takeoff, which resulted in substantial damage to the aft bulkhead and associated structures.
  • CEN10LA2402010-04-30 · BOEING 767 · American Airlines
    The flight crew's inadequate separation from convective activity that resulted in serious injury to an unrestrained flight attendant.
  • DCA03IA0582003-09-25 · McDonnell Douglas MD-80 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    The improper maintenance of the tailcone evacuation system, which prevented the evacuation slide from inflating during an evacuation due to smoke/fumes in the cabin.
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    the jammed condition of the airplane's right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane's parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspec…
What it recommended after them
  • A-04-042The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Expeditiously issue an airworthiness directive to require operators to implement Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 304-25-24 on an accelerated schedu… · DCA03IA058Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-04-043The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Require operators that are operating airplanes with slides with part number 61866-101 inflation cables that have been modified to include a manua… · DCA03IA058Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-19-001TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Complete the development of a modification for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will prevent the possibility of elevator jamming due to ground wind exposure. · DCA17FA076Closed - Reconsidered
  • A-19-002TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Develop new preflight procedures or other mitigations for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will enable a flight crew to verify before takeoff that the elevators are not jammed. · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-003TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Until the actions in Safety Recommendations A-19-1 and -2 are completed, revise the Aircraft Operating Manual and Aircraft Maintenance Manual for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes to lower the ground gu… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Determine if the ground gust limit loads contained in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.415 adequately ensure that critical flight control systems are protected from hazards introduced by ground… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure the operators of Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes have procedures that define who is responsible for monitoring the wind that affects parked airplanes and for notifying maintena… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order JO 7900.5D, Surface Weather Observing, Change 1, to specify sign-off procedures and backup augmentation responsibilities for all types of weather-observing personnel when they are unable… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).