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Cases › CHI08IA022 › The analyst

Airbus Industrie A320-211Northwest Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

7
timed facts
8
precedents
13
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

7 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. about 19:11:50 CDTFDRtakeoffp.2
    Takeoff from Minneapolis
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. about 19:11:55 CDTFDRinitial climbp.2
    Within about 5 seconds of takeoff, Autobrake Decel Lo/Med/Max, Autobrake Fault, Autobrake Off and the brake pedal and brake pressure parameters stopped registering valid data (BSCU/nose wheel steering system fault)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 19:12-19:54 CDTFDRcruisep.2
    Flight continued without apparent incident: climb to 24,000 ft, cruise and descent for approach
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 19:54:24-19:54:37 CDTFDRapproachp.2
    Landing gear selected down; gear down and locked recorded at 19:54:37
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 19:54:57 CDTFDRapproachp.2
    Nose gear weight-on-wheels transitioned from air to ground while airborne (nose gear turned 90 deg, proximity sensor state change)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 19:55:28 CDTFDRapproachp.2
    Autopilot 2, autothrottle and flight director switched from engaged to disengaged; master warning recorded
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 20:06:46 CDTFDRlandingp.2
    Left and right main gear weight-on-wheels indicated ground - landing at Fargo with the nose gear at 90 degrees
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 7 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • LAX05IA3122005-09-22no fatalitiesmatch 99
    Airbus Industrie A320 · Jet Blue Airways, Inc.
    Los Angeles, CA
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26no fatalitiesmatch 94
    Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    Jackson, WY
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • CHI03IA0272002-11-21no fatalitiesmatch 93
    Airbus Industrie A319-131 · United Air LInes
    Chicago, IL
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • MIA04IA0562004-03-11no fatalitiesmatch 92
    Airbus Industrie A300F4-605R · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Fort Lauderdale, FL
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • CHI01IA0552000-12-28no fatalitiesmatch 87
    Embraer EMB-135LR · AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES, INC.
    CHICAGO, IL
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
  • LAX02FA2662002-08-29substantialmatch 86
    Airbus Industrie A320-231 · AMERICA WEST AIRLINES
    Phoenix, AZ
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • CHI04LA0862004-03-15substantialmatch 85
    Beech 1900D · Air Midwest Airlines Inc.
    Manhattan, KS
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
  • CEN15LA1402015-02-10substantialmatch 85
    EMBRAER ERJ 190 100 IGW · US AIRWAYS INC
    Houston, TX
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 2 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 2 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • LAX05IA3122005-09-22 · Airbus Industrie A320 · Jet Blue Airways, Inc.
    The fatigue failure of two anti-rotation lugs due to repeated cyclic pre-landing tests, which allowed the nosewheels to deviate from the 0-degree position on landing gear retraction. A contributing factor was the design of the Brake Steering Control Unit (BSCU) system logic, which prevented the nosewheels from centering. Also contributing was the lack of a procedure to attempt to reset the BSCU system under these conditions.
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26 · Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    the loss of braking action on the left main landing gear due to the cross connection of the wheel speed tachometer wires that was caused by inadequate maintenance performed on the airplane during the installation of the main landing gear.
  • CHI03IA0272002-11-21 · Airbus Industrie A319-131 · United Air LInes
    The maintenance facililty improperly assembled and installed the nose landing gear shock absorber assembly. Factors were the improper assembly which allowed the nose gear to turn 90 degrees to the direction of travel.
  • MIA04IA0562004-03-11 · Airbus Industrie A300F4-605R · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    The flight crews' inadvertent setting of the parking brake during flight resulting in the airplane being landed with the parking brake set and failure of all 8 main landing gear tires during the landing rollout.
  • CHI01IA0552000-12-28 · Embraer EMB-135LR · AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES, INC.
    The jammed horizontal stabilizer trim that occurred during the airplane's initial climb after takeoff. Factors relating to the incident were the inadequate capability of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator to move the stabilizer during all flight phases, and the inadequate design of the system by the manufacturer.
What it recommended after them
  • A-02-024The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Require that all operators of airplanes equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revise their procedures to stipulate that the CVR be deactiv… · CHI01IA055Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-02-025TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that all operators of airplanes equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) test the functionality of the CVR system prior to the first flight of each day, as part of an approved aircraft ch… · CHI01IA055Closed - Superseded

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).