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EMBRAER ERJ 190 100 IGWUS AIRWAYS INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

5
timed facts
8
precedents
22
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

5 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. gear down command (about 22:16 CST)FDRapproachp.4
    All three gears went from Up and Locked to In Transit for 8 s; left and right then Down and Locked, the nose gear stayed In Transit for the rest of the flight; nose WOW changed Air to Ground at the command; nose gear deflection 0 deg on both sensors; master caution for 8 s from about +8 s, master warning at 22:16:11 CST for 3 s
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. about 22:16-23:05 CSTFDRholding/troubleshootingp.4
    Climbed to about 2,900 ft, one left-turning holding loop for 8 min; descended to 1,100 ft, climbed back to 2,900 ft turning right; 2 min hold; third descent to a minimum of 500 ft (about 550 ft AGL) for about one minute (tower fly-by); climbed to 2,900 ft for 18 minutes; fourth descent to land
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 23:06:51 CSTFDRtouchdownp.4
    Air/ground transitioned to ground - main gear touchdown; ground spoilers deployed and deceleration began; thrust reversers deployed on both engines
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 23:06:59 CSTFDRlanding rollp.4
    Nose touched down (nose gear retracted) at about 94 kts, 8 s after the mains; reversers in use for about 17 s after nose contact; left and right brake pressures increased symmetrically from about 10 s after nose touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 23:07:33 CSTFDRstoppedp.4
    Aircraft came to rest with -6 deg pitch
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • cruiseCruised at 36,000 ft for about 2 h 8 min, then descended, levelling at 10,000 ft and again at about 1,900 ft
  • final approachFlaps 37 deg, airspeed steady at 122 kts, pitch, roll and descent rate stable
  • about 37 min after gear up (earlier in the flight)Nose gear deflection sensors shifted from 2.0/2.5 deg (gear stowed) to 0.0/0.0 deg and stayed there for the rest of the flight (compare 1.9/2.4 deg stowed on the earliest recorded takeoff seven flights earlier)
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST FACTUAL REPORT · 8 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)→
  2. Landing-flare/touchdown: Landing gear not configured

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26no fatalitiesmatch 79
    Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    Jackson, WY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14no fatalitiesmatch 79
    BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA23FA3392023-06-28substantialmatch 72
    BOEING 717-200 · Delta Air Lines Inc
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14no fatalitiesmatch 70
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 68
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG22FA0092022-02-04no fatalitiesmatch 66
    BOEING 737-8K2 · Sun Country Airlines, Inc.
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
  • DCA16CA2262016-09-24substantialmatch 66
    BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 202 · Champlain Enterprises, LLC
    Dulles, VA
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ERA09IA0562008-11-16no fatalitiesmatch 66
    DeHavilland DHC-8-311 · Piedmont Airlines
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 7 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 3 of 8Landing gear not configured
  • 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • Task performance › Maintenance
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26 · Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    the loss of braking action on the left main landing gear due to the cross connection of the wheel speed tachometer wires that was caused by inadequate maintenance performed on the airplane during the installation of the main landing gear.
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14 · BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    the failure of the maintenance personnel to properly complete the installation, and the inspection personnel to conduct the proper functional test, of the left main landing gear uplock assembly.
  • DCA23FA3392023-06-28 · BOEING 717-200 · Delta Air Lines Inc
    A fatigue fracture of the upper lock link that initiated along scratch features on the lower surface at the parting line of the forged aluminum component. Contributing to the accident was the overhaul facilities noncompliance with Service Bulletin 717-32-002.
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    The nose landing gear’s failure to fully extend due to missing and damaged fastening hardware on the drive arm assembly.
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10 · AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    A mechanical failure of internal components of the right main landing gear door actuator resulting in the flight crew being unable to fully extend the right main landing gear using the normal and alternate procedures. Contributing to this incident was a circular reference in the company Flight Manual in which the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist referred back to the Landing Gear Unsafe Indication After Extension checklist rather than the Landing Gear - Partial Gear or Gear Up Landing checklist.
What it recommended after them
  • A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).