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BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19SKYWEST AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

10
timed facts
8
precedents
27
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

10 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 20:52:36 CDTFDRapproachp.3
    About 1 hour after takeoff, descending through 2,745 ft, the left landing gear transitioned to Down and Locked
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 20:52:40 CDTFDRapproachp.3
    Nose gear Down and Locked at about 2,618 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 20:52:58 CDTFDRapproachp.3
    Landing gear disagree warning Active at about 2,217 ft (right gear not down)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 20:54:20-20:54:21 CDTFDRgo-aroundp.3
    Right gear briefly Down and Locked at about 2,869 ft (climbing); gear disagree warning back to Not Active a second later
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 20:54:57-20:55:00 CDTFDRgo-aroundp.3
    Right gear back to Not Down and Locked; left and nose gear also Not Down and Locked (gear retracted)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 20:55-21:04:57 CDTFDRholdingp.3
    Holding at about 4,150 ft: nose gear cycled six times between Not Down and Locked and Down and Locked, then stayed Down and Locked to touchdown; right gear Down and Locked and back from 21:00:36 to 21:01:06
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 21:05:40 CDTFDRholdingp.3
    Hydraulic system 3 pressure dropped from about 2,720 psi to 14 psi (system 3 pumps cycled during gear troubleshooting)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 21:05:40-21:13:14 CDTFDRholdingp.3
    Hydraulic pressure 3 cycled: up to 2,720 psi, down to 10 psi, up to 2,700, down to 14, then up to 2,680 psi where it remained to touchdown; altitude steady at about 4,150 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 21:19:50 CDTFDRapproachp.4
    Left gear Down and Locked (remained so) at about 900 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 21:33:04-21:33:05 CDTFDRlandingp.4
    Left gear WOW Air to Ground, nose gear WOW Ground one second later - landing on 19R with the right main gear retracted; recording ended 21:34:00
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 10 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)→
  2. Landing: Landing gear not configured

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28no fatalitiesmatch 76
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Landing gear not configured
  • ERA09IA3382009-06-11no fatalitiesmatch 76
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B1 · Atlantic Southeast Airlines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    • ●Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 73
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA13FA0942013-05-18substantialmatch 68
    BOMBARDIER DHC8 · Piedmont Airlines
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14no fatalitiesmatch 67
    BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14no fatalitiesmatch 65
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA20LA1382020-08-19substantialmatch 63
    Boeing 767 · Federal Express
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05substantialmatch 61
    BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Chattanooga, TN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 2 of 8Landing gear not configured
  • 2 of 8Landing gear collapse
  • 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally and manually for reasons that could not be conclusively determined.
  • ERA09IA3382009-06-11 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B1 · Atlantic Southeast Airlines
    The failure of the left main landing gear to extend due to high levels of particulate contamination in the hydraulic fluid.
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10 · AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    A mechanical failure of internal components of the right main landing gear door actuator resulting in the flight crew being unable to fully extend the right main landing gear using the normal and alternate procedures. Contributing to this incident was a circular reference in the company Flight Manual in which the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist referred back to the Landing Gear Unsafe Indication After Extension checklist rather than the Landing Gear - Partial Gear or Gear Up Landing checklist.
  • DCA13FA0942013-05-18 · BOMBARDIER DHC8 · Piedmont Airlines
    the frozen left main landing gear (MLG) uplock roller due to lack of lubrication and the uplock latch that had worn beyond acceptable tolerances, which prevented the flight crew from extending the left MLG using the alternate extension system. Contributing to the accident were the operator's improper maintenance practices, which did not detect the lubrication issue with the roller and the wear of the latch.
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14 · BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    the failure of the maintenance personnel to properly complete the installation, and the inspection personnel to conduct the proper functional test, of the left main landing gear uplock assembly.
What it recommended after them
  • A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-25-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to inspect the bannis latches on Boeing 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplane doors and, if necessary, modify or replace them so they comply with the correct confi… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to inspect and, if necessary, modify or rep… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to update their Boeing 757 200, 200CB, and -300 series airplane aircraft maintenance manuals (AMM) in accordance with the revised Boeing AMM and illustrated parts cat… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to update their aircraft maintenance manual… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-007TO BOEING: Once the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual and illustrated parts catalog are updated to provide a consistent and accurate depiction of the bannis latch assembly, issue a service bulletin advising Boeing 757 operators to insp… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-008TO BOEING: Issue a service bulletin advising operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757 200, 200CB, and -300 series) to inspect those airplanes and, if necessary, modify or… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).