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Cases › CEN11IA369 › The analyst

EMBRAER EMB-145AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

3
timed facts
8
precedents
4
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

3 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 06:03:58 CDTFDRtouchdownp.2
    Air/ground switch first recorded ground at 132 kts indicated airspeed, then air for 2 s before ground again (bounce/skip)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 06:04:00-06:04:10 CDTFDRlanding rollp.2
    Brake pressures #1 and #3 increased, peaking at 1,426 and 1,534 psi within 10 s; maximum longitudinal deceleration -0.39 g at 06:04:10
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. after 06:04:10 CDTFDRlanding rollp.2
    #3 brake pressure decreased to a nominal value and stayed there for the rest of the recording (brake failure/separation)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 3 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Prior to flight: Aircraft maintenance event→
  2. Landing-landing roll: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)→
  3. Landing-landing roll: Part(s) separation from AC

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26no fatalitiesmatch 54
    Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    Jackson, WY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA20LA0472019-12-23substantialmatch 54
    BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA18FA1442018-04-20substantialmatch 53
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 83(MD-83) · Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc
    Alexandria, LA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14no fatalitiesmatch 52
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA23FA4172023-08-21substantialmatch 51
    BOEING 737-890 · Alaska Airlines
    Santa Ana, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CEN11IA2642011-03-30no fatalitiesmatch 50
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · PINNACLE AIRLINES INC
    Detroit, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Part(s) separation from AC
  • DCA25LA0252024-10-24substantialmatch 49
    BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Houston, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Part(s) separation from AC
  • CEN15LA1402015-02-10substantialmatch 49
    EMBRAER ERJ 190 100 IGW · US AIRWAYS INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 3 of 8Landing gear collapse
  • 2 of 8Part(s) separation from AC
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Experience/knowledge › Knowledge
  • Experience/knowledge › Training
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Maintenance

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26 · Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    the loss of braking action on the left main landing gear due to the cross connection of the wheel speed tachometer wires that was caused by inadequate maintenance performed on the airplane during the installation of the main landing gear.
  • DCA20LA0472019-12-23 · BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
    Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during its initial overhaul, which caused heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue crack that caused the pin to fail during the accident flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the excessive grinding during the initial overhaul and the fatigue crack during the subsequent overhaul.
  • DCA18FA1442018-04-20 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 83(MD-83) · Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc
    the failure of the right main landing gear under normal loads due to fatigue cracking in an area subject to an FAA Airworthiness Directive that was not adequately inspected.
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    The nose landing gear’s failure to fully extend due to missing and damaged fastening hardware on the drive arm assembly.
  • DCA23FA4172023-08-21 · BOEING 737-890 · Alaska Airlines
    Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during machining, which imparted heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue cracking that caused the pin to fracture during landing.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).