FlarePath
Cases › CEN10IA157 › The analyst

EMBRAER EMB-145LREXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
7
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
Try

Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • approach from 10,000 ft (plot 1)Approach via waypoints KAYTO, PINKK and MONKZ plotted with latitude/longitude, roll, heading, autopilot, pitch, pitch trim, both control columns, right elevator, airspeed, altitude and radio altitudes
  • shortly after PINKKAutopilot disconnected (crew reported this as the moment of the lightning strike); no obvious control binding - control column and right elevator movements correlate well; no other bus, display or warning discrete changed state at that time
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 2 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach-IFR final approach: Other weather encounter→
  2. Approach-IFR final approach: Flight control sys malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG26LA0112025-11-23no fatalitiesmatch 58
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C11 · SkyWest Airlines Inc.
    Hibbing, MN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN10IA2192010-04-18no fatalitiesmatch 55
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Kansas City, MO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08substantialmatch 52
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    Ypsilanti, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA22LA2122022-09-22no fatalitiesmatch 52
    AIRBUS A330-243 · Hawaiian Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA25LA1972025-05-02substantialmatch 50
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Centerville, TN
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather
    Other weather encounter
  • DCA22MA0092021-10-19destroyedmatch 49
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
    Brookshire, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA23FA4282023-08-29no fatalitiesmatch 47
    AIRBUS SAS A350-941 · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather
  • DCA24LA1352024-03-28no fatalitiesmatch 46
    BOEING 757-232 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Lakeland, GA
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
  • 2 of 8Turbulence encounter
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Flight control system
  • Conditions/weather/phenomena › Convective weather
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG26LA0112025-11-23 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C11 · SkyWest Airlines Inc.
    The elevator control restriction was caused by the failure of an elevator autopilot servo control cable which failed due to cyclic fatigue. The slack in the cable wrapped around the servo mount in such a way that it interfered with the rotation of the servo mount. The servo mount remained connected to the aft side of the elevator control quadrant by the intact aft cables. This condition resulted in the limited rotation of the elevator control quadrant in one direction.
  • CEN10IA2192010-04-18 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    The malfunction of the airplane’s aileron control system due to ice accumulation.
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    the jammed condition of the airplane's right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane's parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspec…
  • DCA22LA2122022-09-22 · AIRBUS A330-243 · Hawaiian Airlines
    Uncommanded movement of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer control wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
  • DCA25LA1972025-05-02 · BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    An encounter with hail during descent.
What it recommended after them
  • A-19-001TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Complete the development of a modification for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will prevent the possibility of elevator jamming due to ground wind exposure. · DCA17FA076Closed - Reconsidered
  • A-19-002TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Develop new preflight procedures or other mitigations for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will enable a flight crew to verify before takeoff that the elevators are not jammed. · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-003TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Until the actions in Safety Recommendations A-19-1 and -2 are completed, revise the Aircraft Operating Manual and Aircraft Maintenance Manual for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes to lower the ground gu… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Determine if the ground gust limit loads contained in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.415 adequately ensure that critical flight control systems are protected from hazards introduced by ground… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure the operators of Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes have procedures that define who is responsible for monitoring the wind that affects parked airplanes and for notifying maintena… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-19-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order JO 7900.5D, Surface Weather Observing, Change 1, to specify sign-off procedures and backup augmentation responsibilities for all types of weather-observing personnel when they are unable… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).