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Cases › CEN10IA084 › The analyst

ATR ATR72EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
42
passages to ask

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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • SRN 534,680-540,920 (event flight)Entire flight plotted in basic, flight control, miscellaneous and pitch parameter groups (figures 1-24), including the 22-lb pitch effort discretes, pitch disconnect warning, elevators L/R, control columns L/R and pitch trim; no narrative values given
  • previous 91 flights (figures 25-32)Review of all 91 recorded take-offs and landings: elevator positions at +5 deg (gust lock engaged) nine times before takeoff and eight times after landing
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 2 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute-descent: Flight control sys malf/fail→
  2. Landing: Flight control sys malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • CHI08MA2702008-09-013 fatalmatch 62
    CONVAIR CV-580
    Columbus, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • WPR11MA4542011-09-161 fatalmatch 60
    NORTH AMERICAN/AERO CLASSICS P-51D · James K Leeward
    Reno, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08substantialmatch 56
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    Ypsilanti, MI
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • ENG26LA0112025-11-23no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C11 · SkyWest Airlines Inc.
    Hibbing, MN
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • DCA22MA0092021-10-19destroyedmatch 47
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
    Brookshire, TX
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN11IA2642011-03-30no fatalitiesmatch 43
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · PINNACLE AIRLINES INC
    Detroit, MI
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • CEN10IA1572010-03-13no fatalitiesmatch 43
    EMBRAER EMB-145LR · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    Chicago, IL
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN11IA1982011-02-21no fatalitiesmatch 43
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Southlake, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
  • 2 of 8Aircraft maintenance event
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft structures › Empennage structure
  • Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft systems › Flight control system
  • Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • CHI08MA2702008-09-01 · CONVAIR CV-580
    The improper (reverse) rigging of the elevator trim cables by company maintenance personnel, and their subsequent failure to discover the misrigging during required post-maintenance checks. Contributing to the accident was the captain’s inadequate post-maintenance preflight check and the flight crew’s improper response to the trim problem.
  • WPR11MA4542011-09-16 · NORTH AMERICAN/AERO CLASSICS P-51D · James K Leeward
    The reduced stiffness of the elevator trim tab system that allowed aerodynamic flutter to occur at racing speeds. The reduced stiffness was a result of deteriorated locknut inserts that allowed the trim tab attachment screws to become loose and to initiate fatigue cracking in one screw sometime before the accident flight. Aerodynamic flutter of the trim tabs resulted in a failure of the left trim tab link assembly, elevator movement, high flight loads, and a loss of control. Contributing to the accident were the un…
  • DCA17FA0762017-03-08 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    the jammed condition of the airplane's right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane's parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspec…
  • ENG26LA0112025-11-23 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C11 · SkyWest Airlines Inc.
    The elevator control restriction was caused by the failure of an elevator autopilot servo control cable which failed due to cyclic fatigue. The slack in the cable wrapped around the servo mount in such a way that it interfered with the rotation of the servo mount. The servo mount remained connected to the aft side of the elevator control quadrant by the intact aft cables. This condition resulted in the limited rotation of the elevator control quadrant in one direction.
  • DCA22MA0092021-10-19 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
    The jammed condition of both elevators, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic high wind while the airplane was parked and prevented the airplane from rotating during the takeoff roll. Also causal was the failure of Everts Air Cargo, the pilots’ primary employer, to maintain awareness of Boeing-issued, required updates for its manuals, which resulted in the pilots not receiving the procedures and training that addressed the requirement to visually verify during the preflight checks that the elevators ar…
What it recommended after them
  • A-12-008TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, volume 3, chapter 6, section 1, paragraph 3-151 and Advisory Circular 91-45C, "Waivers: Aviation Ev… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-12-009TO THE NATIONAL AIR RACING GROUP UNLIMITED DIVISION: Require aircraft owners in the unlimited class to provide an engineering evaluation that includes flight demonstrations and analysis within the anticipated flight envelope for aircraft wi… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-010TO THE NATIONAL AIR RACING GROUP UNLIMITED DIVISION: Develop a system that tracks any discrepancies noted during prerace technical inspections and verifies that they have been resolved. · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-011TO THE NATIONAL AIR RACING GROUP UNLIMITED DIVISION: Provide high g training to pilots, including techniques to mitigate the potential effects of high g exposure, as part of preparations before the Reno National Championship Air Races (NCAR… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-012TO THE NATIONAL AIR RACING GROUP UNLIMITED DIVISION: Evaluate the feasibility of requiring pilots to wear g suits when racing at the Reno National Championship Air Races; if the evaluation determines it is feasible, implement a requirement. · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-013TO THE RENO AIR RACING ASSOCIATION: Require aircraft owners, as a condition of eligibility to participate in the Reno National Championship Air Races, to provide an engineering evaluation that includes flight demonstrations and analysis wit… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-014TO THE RENO AIR RACING ASSOCIATION: Evaluate the design of the unlimited class course and safety areas to minimize maneuvering near and potential conflicts with spectators; if warranted by the results of the evaluation, implement changes to… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-015TO THE RENO AIR RACING ASSOCIATION: Take the following actions to raise the level of safety for spectators and personnel near the race course: (1) relocate the fuel truck away from the ramp area and (2) in front of any area where spectators… · WPR11MA454Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).