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Cases › CEN09FA094 › The analyst

BOMBARDIER CL-600-2C10Mesa Airlines, Inc

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
7
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • takeoffLeft, right and nose WOW transitioned from ground to air
  • about 22 minutes after takeoffIn the descent the right and nose gear went down and locked but the left did not; gear disagree and master warning activated
  • about 3 minutes laterGear cycled; right and nose again down and locked, left again not, with master warning and gear disagree; states stayed active for the next 38 minutes until landing
  • touchdownRight and nose WOW transitioned air to ground; left WOW did not change state; after coming to rest the roll angle measured -9 degrees (left wing down)
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 4 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach-IFR initial approach: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)→
  2. Landing: Landing gear not configured

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14no fatalitiesmatch 63
    BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CEN11IA6152011-09-01no fatalitiesmatch 61
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC
    Baton Rouge, LA
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Landing gear not configured
  • CEN11IA3792011-06-07no fatalitiesmatch 59
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Milwaukee, WI
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 58
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA16CA2262016-09-24substantialmatch 55
    BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 202 · Champlain Enterprises, LLC
    Dulles, VA
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CEN15LA1402015-02-10substantialmatch 55
    EMBRAER ERJ 190 100 IGW · US AIRWAYS INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
    Landing gear not configuredSys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28no fatalitiesmatch 54
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    Milwaukee, WI
    Landing gear not configured
  • DCA12FA0582012-04-07substantialmatch 52
    BOMBARDIER INC DHC-8-402 · COLGAN AIR INC
    Houston, TX
    Landing gear not configured

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 7 of 8Landing gear not configured
  • 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Task performance › Maintenance
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections
  • Aircraft structures › Doors
  • Development › Manufacture/production
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA09IA0172008-12-14 · BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION
    the failure of the maintenance personnel to properly complete the installation, and the inspection personnel to conduct the proper functional test, of the left main landing gear uplock assembly.
  • CEN11IA6152011-09-01 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC
    The improperly installed upper attachment bolt in the left main landing gear uplock assembly, which led to the failure of the left main landing gear to extend before landing. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel's lack of training on the installation and inspection of the uplock assembly.
  • CEN11IA3792011-06-07 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    The failure of the right main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally, which resulted from the combination of a slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, and contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system. Also causal to the accident was the failure of the right MLG to extend manually using the alternate gear selector handle due to the improper use of lubricant within the alternate release handle assembly, which prevented the handle from remainin…
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10 · AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    A mechanical failure of internal components of the right main landing gear door actuator resulting in the flight crew being unable to fully extend the right main landing gear using the normal and alternate procedures. Contributing to this incident was a circular reference in the company Flight Manual in which the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist referred back to the Landing Gear Unsafe Indication After Extension checklist rather than the Landing Gear - Partial Gear or Gear Up Landing checklist.
  • DCA16CA2262016-09-24 · BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 202 · Champlain Enterprises, LLC
    incorrect installation of the frangible towing fuse that prevented the nose landing gear from extending.
What it recommended after them
  • A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).