FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOEING 757-251 — Atlanta, GA, USA, 2011-10-10

NTSB number
ENG12IA001
Operator
Delta Air Lines Inc
Registration
N553NW
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Minor
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

The diffuser case of a Pratt & Whitney PW2037(M) engine installed on a B757-200 airplane ruptured during takeoff roll at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia (ATL). The force of the case rupture caused the hinge-mounted core cowl halves to distort and strike the leading edge and underside of the airplane's left wing, resulting in minor airplane damage. Metallurgical investigation and review of the engine's maintenance records determined that cracks in the engine's diffuser case rear flange (M-flange) and cracks in the HPT case forward flange (M-flange) were not detected when the cases underwent fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) during the engine's last shop visit, 3,479 cycles before the event. The undetected cracks continued to  propagate, leading to the in-service diffuser case rupture. The reason for the ineffective inspection was not determined, but was narrowed to chronological- and operator-based scenarios. A suspect population of 50 engines was identified that included sub-populations for both possibilities. The FAA published airworthiness directive (AD) 2014-05-32, requiring the M-flanges of PW2037, PW2037D, PW2037M, PW2040, PW2040D, PW2043, PW2143, PW2240, PW2337, PW2643, and F117-PW-100 engines in the identified suspect population to undergo eddy current inspection within 100 flight cycles or 30 days. No additional cracks were found. As a result of the investigation, the FAA published airworthiness directive (AD) 2014-05-32, which requires the M-flanges of PW2000 engines with certain diffuser and HPT cases installed to undergo eddy current inspection within 100 flight cycles or 30 days. AD 2014-05-32 also requires that high-sensitivity FPI penetrant be used when accomplishing FPI of the PW2037, PW2037D, PW2037M, PW2040, PW2040D, PW2043, PW2143, PW2240, PW2337, PW2643, and F117-PW-100 diffuser case M-flange and the HPT case M-flange. In addition, AD 2014-05-32 makes the performance of diffuser and HPT case M-flange high-sensitivity FPI at every piece part opportunity  an airworthiness limitation for PW2037, PW2037D, PW2037M, PW2040, PW2040D, PW2043, PW2146, PW2240, PW2337, PW2643, and F117-PW-100 engines. 
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

the return to service of overhauled airplane engine parts with undetected fatigue cracks, resulting in complete loss of engine power and uncontained engine failure. A contributing factor was the inadequate diffuser and HPT case inspection procedure.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

— 213,644 samples, 25 parameters, 21:48:20.0 to 23:08:20.9.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Pressure altitude ft40,012.022:13:06.1141.021:50:35.1847.023:08:20.1
Computed airspeed kts384.021:48:23.40.021:48:20.4384.023:08:20.4
Vertical acceleration g1.321:53:42.40.823:03:03.81.023:08:20.9
Engine 1 N1 %RPM91.922:00:36.021.223:04:25.022.123:08:20.0
Engine 2 N1 %RPM92.422:00:45.521.623:04:26.521.923:08:20.5
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
15:15:45 EDT (approx.)FDR first powered on and started recording data before the event3
~15:19:XX EDT (during takeoff roll, about 9 seconds of acceleration)Aircraft accelerated for approximately 9 seconds, computed airspeed reached a maximum of 60 knots3
~60 kiasFlight crew heard a loud bang and noted left engine fire indications; No. 1 (left) engine failure during takeoff roll1
Following the bang/fire indicationCaptain aborted the takeoff; aircraft decelerated for approximately 23 seconds3
After rejected takeoffThe airplane was taxied back to the gate without further incident and the passengers were deplaned normally1
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 3 of 5 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report13pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1 (FDR tabular data for event)csv
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 2 (FDR tabular data for first previous flight)csv
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 3 (FDR tabular data for second previous flight)csv

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=ENG12IA001. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.