FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 — Milwaukee, WI, USA, 2010-09-28

NTSB number
ENG10IA055
Operator
SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
Registration
N498CA
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Minor
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

While the flight crew was configuring the airplane for landing and shortly after placing the landing gear selector in the "down" position, they noted a "gear disagree" warning message displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system that showed that the nose gear and the right main landing gear (MLG) were down and locked but that the left MLG was in transit. The flight crew followed the quick reference handbook directions to troubleshoot the landing gear issue without success. The flight crewmembers then tried to extend the landing gear by pulling the alternate landing gear release handle; however, the left MLG failed to extend, and they subsequently landed the airplane with the left MLG retracted. During postincident activities, the airplane was lifted, and an examination revealed that the left MLG remained in its full-up position within the wheel well. The alternate landing gear release handle was found in its fully extended position. The incident airplane's left MLG uplock pin exhibited signs of slight wear and flat spotting, consistent with in-service usage, and the uplock mechanism latch had wear marks that were within the in-service maintenance wear limits. After the incident, functional ground testing of the airplane's landing gear system found that, although wear was observed on these system components, the left MLG extended as designed when the landing gear was selected down normally and manually.  Additionally, the incident airliner's left MLG uplock pin was found properly rigged within its mating uplock mechanism.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the worn components alone would have prevented the left MLG from extending during the incident flight. Functional performance testing of the left MLG sidestay actuator showed that it operated within all test specifications. Although an examination of the actuator's restrictor assembly found that it contained two small pieces of aluminum and several particles of debris this contamination did not prevent the actuator from operating during ground tests after the incident.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the contamination within the left MLG sidestay actuator would have prevented the left MLG from extending during the incident flight. The force to operate the lever on the bypass valve was measured and found to be 60 lbs, which exceeded the acceptance test procedure -specified force requirement of 40 lbs. However, during the incident flight, the nose and both MLG uplock assemblies did unlock when the alternate landing gear release handle was pulled indicating that the bypass valve functioned during the flight. As previously discussed, neither hydraulic contamination within the left MLG actuator nor any single MLG system component was identified as preventing the left MLG from extending during the incident flight.  However, because the left MLG failed to extend when the crew used either the normal or alternate extension systems, it is likely that a combination of several factors contributed to the system malfunction. Some potential factors are: uplock pin rigging and/or wear, uplock mechanism latch wear, hydraulic system pressure and contamination, and bypass valve operation.  Even though these items may be within maintenance limits when considered individually, there may be combinations of these factors that result in failure of the gear to extend.  When combined with environmental and flight related conditions such as temperature, humidity, and landing gear component deflection due to in-flight loading, the interaction results of all of these factors are difficult to predict and to demonstrate during testing.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally and manually for reasons that could not be conclusively determined.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

— 273,340 samples, 70 parameters, 20:41:00.0 to 22:10:46.0.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Vertical acceleration g5.022:10:42.9-4.422:10:42.51.022:10:45.9
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
21:43:35Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'3
21:43:36Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'3
21:43:38Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'3
21:43:43Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'3
21:43:47Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'3
21:44:04Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active'3
21:44:17Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'3
21:44:20Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'3
21:44:26Gear Uplock-L and Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'3
21:44:27Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Active' to 'Not Active'3
21:46:02Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'3
21:46:03Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'4
21:46:05Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'4
21:46:10Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'4
21:46:14Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'4
21:46:32Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active'4
21:52:50Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'4
21:52:53Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Dn+Lck' to 'Not Dn+Lck'4
21:52:58Gear Uplock-L transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'4
21:52:59Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'4
21:53:00Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Not Up+Lck' to 'Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Active' to 'Not Active'4
21:57:06Gear Uplock-L and Gear Uplock-N transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'4
21:57:07Gear Uplock-R transitioned from 'Up+Lck' to 'Not Up+Lck'; Gear Disagree Warn transitioned from 'Not Active' to 'Active' and remained 'Active' for the rest of the recorded data4
21:57:12Gear Dnlock-N transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'4
21:57:19Gear Dnlock-R transitioned from 'Not Dn+Lck' to 'Dn+Lck'4
22:10:08Gear WOW-R transitioned from 'Air' to 'Grnd'4
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 26 of 26 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report23pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1 (tabular FDR data for figures 1 to 16)csv
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 2 (tabular FDR data for figure 17)csv
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Specialist's Factual Report5pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=ENG10IA055. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.