During initial climbout shortly after takeoff, Southwest Airlines flight 554 struck and ingested a bird into its No. 1 (left) engine, resulting in damage to the left engine fan blades and a partial loss of engine power. The airplane began to “shake violently with a distinct loss of thrust” in the left engine. The engine master caution activated, and the captain reported that he heard the fire bell sound. The captain called for the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist on the Quick Reference Card (QRC). According to the captain, after the first officer (FO) started the checklist, the cockpit began to fill with “acrid white smoke.” The FO called out “masks,” the pilots donned their masks, and they resumed performance of the checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency to air traffic control and requested airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) in preparation for the flight’s return to the departure airport. The flight crew notified the cabin crew and passengers about the emergency. The captain later reported that, due to the smoke, his instrument panel was difficult to see and that he thought he might need to fly the airplane by solely using the heads-up guidance system. However, the captain stated that the smoke began to rapidly dissipate after the FO pulled the engine fire switch. After flight 554 landed and came to a full stop, ARFF personnel inspected the airplane before the flight crew taxied to the assigned gate. The passengers deplaned normally, and no injuries were reported. Postaccident examination found that the smoke in the cockpit was a result of the activation of the No. 1 engine’s load reduction device (LRD) after the bird ingestion. LRD activation is designed to reduce the severity of the vibration transmitted into the airframe by disconnecting the left engine’s fan blades from the turbomachinery. When the LRD activated, tubes supplying oil to the engine sump became dislodged and the flange from the sump area opened, allowing engine oil to enter the core compressor upstream of the pneumatic bleed ports that supply bleed air to the cabin and cockpit. The oil was exposed to high temperatures and resulted in smoke and fumes that were then fed into the cockpit. About 15 seconds after the bird ingestion, the left engine’s core speed (N2) was below 62% rpm, which would have de-energized the engine’s running relay and subsequently closed the pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV). Following the closure of the PRSOV, which was the point of access into the cockpit, the smoke and fumes would have quickly dissipated. Considering that both crewmembers described the airplane as shaking following the bird ingestion, the captain’s decision to begin the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist was appropriate (one of the conditions for using the checklist was airframe vibrations). Although the crew did not report performing the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist, the first officer stating “masks” accomplished two of the three memory items by donning their one-piece oxygen masks. Postincident review of this checklist found that it instructed pilots to turn off various switches, including the RECIRC FAN switches at step 9. It is not until step 11 that the checklist instructs that if the smoke or fumes become the greatest threat, pilots should reference another checklist. It is likely that the incident flight crew would have performed the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist first if they had not experienced severe airframe vibration following the bird ingestion. Boeing released a flight crew operations manual (FCOM) bulletin on February 9, 2024, that described the results of the bird ingestion in this incident and the actions a flight crew should take if they experience a similar incident. Boeing also updated the system description in the Boeing 737-8 FCOM on November 15, 2024, and the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) on November 30, 2024, to include engine failure with smoke or fumes in the flight deck or cabin as a condition to trigger reference to the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation QRC. Although the NTSB found no clear evidence of significant toxic or irritant exposure to the flight crew resulting from the LRD activation on the incident flight, such an event may pose a toxicological risk. There are insufficient data to reliably determine the nature and magnitude of such risk, especially at what is expected to be limited exposure duration. It is reasonable to consider the potential for irritant effects on the pilots among the threats to the immediate safety of the flight in an LRD-related smoke event.
A partial loss of engine power due to bird ingestion in the No. 1 (left) engine, which resulted in the activation of the load reduction device to prevent vibration. The load reduction device activation resulted in smoke and fumes entering the cockpit.
FDR File · N8830Q — 106,200 samples, 49 parameters, 14:12:00.0 to 14:26:60.0.
| Parameter | Max | at | Min | at | Final | at |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Computed airspeed kts | 223.0 | 14:17:17.6 | 45.0 | 14:12:00.1 | 45.0 | 14:26:59.8 |
| Ground speed kts | 244.0 | 14:17:16.8 | 1.0 | 14:26:57.3 | 1.0 | 14:26:59.8 |
| Pitch attitude deg | 15.3 | 14:13:56.4 | -0.5 | 14:13:00.4 | -0.2 | 14:26:59.9 |
| Roll attitude deg | 15.3 | 14:24:05.9 | -21.4 | 14:20:26.1 | -0.2 | 14:26:59.9 |
| Vertical acceleration g | 1.5 | 14:26:06.6 | 0.7 | 14:14:03.6 | 1.0 | 14:26:59.9 |
| Engine 1 N1 %RPM | 83.0 | 14:13:58.2 | 0.0 | 14:26:56.2 | 0.0 | 14:26:59.2 |
| Engine 2 N1 %RPM | 91.9 | 14:16:34.7 | 19.0 | 14:12:10.7 | 19.5 | 14:26:59.7 |
| Time | Event | Page |
|---|---|---|
| 14:13:04 CST | Groundspeed began to rapidly increase from 8 knots (kts), consistent with the aircraft beginning takeoff roll. The aircraft was on runway 11 at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (KMSY). | 6 |
| 14:13:39 CST | The air/ground relay switch changed from ground to air. | 6 |
| 14:13:44 CST | All three gear green lights were off, consistent with the gear no longer down and locked. | 6 |
| 14:14:01 CST | While passing through 687 feet (ft) radio altitude and 170 kts computed airspeed, engine 1 N1 began to rollback from 83.0 percent revolutions per minute (%RPM). | 6 |
| 14:14:02 CST | While passing through 747 ft radio altitude and 167 kts computed airspeed, engine 1 channel B airborne vibration monitor (AVM) increased from 0.1406 to 0.1797. | 6 |
| 14:14:04 CST | The aircraft passed through 810 ft radio altitude and the computed airspeed was 164 kts. Engine 1 Fail status changed from normal to fail. | 6 |
| 14:14:05 CST | Engine 1 N1 was 16.5 %RPM and continued to reduce to a minimum value of 6.1 %RPM, 46 seconds later (14:14:51 CST). | 6 |
| 14:14:09 CST | Engine 1 channel A and B AVM began to rapidly increase. | 6 |
| 14:14:12 CST | Engine 1 channel B AVM reached a maximum recorded value of 5. One second later, engine 1 channel A reached a maximum recorded value of 5. Note, Engine 1 channel A and B AVM operational range is limited at a maximum scalar value of 5. | 7 |
| 14:14:14 CST | The aircraft passed through 900 ft radio altitude and the computed airspeed was 167 kts. The master caution activated and remained active for the next 11 seconds. Engine 1 N2 was 57.9 %RPM and continued to reduce to a minimum value of 0.0 %RPM, 76 seconds later (14:15:30 CST). | 7 |
| 14:14:16 QAR CST | The left pressure regulating and shutoff valve (PRSOV) command changed from commanded open to commanded close. The left PRSOV remained closed the remainder of the flight. | 7 |
| 14:14:17 QAR CST | The left environmental control system (ECS) pack changed from on to off. The left ECS pack remained off for the remainder of the flight. The right ECS pack remained on. | 7 |
| 14:14:31 CST | The master caution activated and remained active for the next 2 minutes and 41 seconds. | 7 |
| 14:16:07 CST | The autothrottle (AT) disconnect switch was pressed. Subsequently, the AT was disengaged. | 7 |
| 14:16:14 CST | Engine 1 throttle resolver angle (TRA) began to reduce from 66.45 degrees. Four seconds later, it reached 36.04 degrees. | 7 |
| 14:16:25 CST | Engine 1 start lever was changed from run to cutoff. | 7 |
| 14:16:56 QAR CST | Engine 1 fire handle was pulled. | 7 |
| 14:19:00 CST | The auxiliary power unit (APU) changed from off to on. The APU remained on for the remainder of the flight. | 7 |
| 14:19:59 CST | The master caution activated and remained active for the next 5 seconds. | 7 |
| 14:20:08 QAR CST | The ECS isolation valve changed from closed to open. The ECS isolation valve was open the remainder of the flight. | 7 |
| 14:23:32 CST | The master caution activated and remained active for the next 9 seconds. | 7 |
| 14:24:12 CST | The speedbrake was armed. | 7 |
| 14:24:16 CST | Gear Lever Up transitioned from UP to NOT UP and Gear Lever Down transitioned from NOT DN to DOWN. | 7 |
| 14:24:28 CST | All three gear green lights were on, consistent with the main and nose gears down and locked. | 7 |
| 14:24:42 CST | The flap handle began to increase. One second later, the flap handle was at 15 degrees. | 7 |
| 14:26:05 CST | The air/ground relay switch changed from air to ground, consistent with the aircraft landing. The aircraft landed on runway 11 at KMSY. | 8 |
| 14:26:06 CST | The master caution activated and remained active for the next 2 seconds. | 8 |
| 14:26:10 CST | Engine 2 thrust reverser was deployed. Engine 1 thrust reverser was not deployed and remained stowed. | 8 |
| 14:26:57 CST | The groundspeed recorded was 1 kt. The aircraft position remained constant on runway 11, slightly past taxiway delta. | 8 |
| 14:33:00 CST | End of valid recorded FDR data. | 8 |
| 14:33:45 QAR CST | End of valid recorded QAR data. The aircraft position was in spot bravo 8 at the terminal at KMSY. | 8 |
Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA24LA330. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.