FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

Boeing 767 — Trinity Bay, TX, USA, 2019-02-23

NTSB number
DCA19MA086
Operator
Atlas Air
Registration
N1217A
Highest injury
Fatal · 3 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Destroyed
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-20/02.  On February 23, 2019, at 1239 central standard time, Atlas Air Inc. flight 3591, a Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, was destroyed after it rapidly descended from an altitude of about 6,000 ft mean sea level and crashed into a shallow, muddy marsh area of Trinity Bay, Texas, about 41 miles east-southeast of George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The captain, first officer, and a nonrevenue pilot riding in the jumpseat died. Atlas operated the airplane as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 domestic cargo flight for Amazon.com Services LLC, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida, about 1033 (1133 eastern standard time) and was destined for IAH.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry's selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer's aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to implement the pilot records database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

Boeing 767-300F · N1217A — 427,521 samples, 109 parameters, 10:27:09.1 to 12:39:02.9.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Pressure altitude ft40,036.011:56:40.5-216.010:29:27.5224.012:39:02.5
Radio altitude ft5,500.010:34:52.2-8.010:27:10.2305.012:39:02.2
Computed airspeed kts433.512:39:02.30.010:27:10.3433.512:39:02.3
Ground speed kts486.010:49:45.60.010:29:42.6385.012:39:02.6
Pitch attitude deg19.010:33:36.7-49.612:38:57.7-16.212:39:02.7
Roll attitude deg26.412:36:47.8-27.110:35:13.8-4.612:39:02.8
Vertical acceleration g4.312:39:00.6-1.012:38:50.44.012:39:02.9
Engine 1 N1 %RPM111.012:38:42.726.010:27:09.766.012:39:02.7
Engine 2 N1 %RPM111.012:38:43.225.010:27:12.268.012:39:02.2
Magnetic heading deg359.610:35:57.80.010:36:26.8267.212:39:02.8
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
10:33Aircraft departed and climbed for about 20 minutes to a cruise altitude of 40,000 ft; center autopilot and autothrottle engaged shortly after takeoff and remained engaged for the remainder of the flight5
12:25Initial descent out of 34,000 ft began; autoflight systems in LNAV/VNAV modes5
12:36:27Autopilot lateral mode changed from LNAV to Heading Select; immediately before reaching 10,000 ft the captain's radio mic was keyed5
12:36:35Aircraft reached 10,000 ft5
about 12:37:00Autopilot vertical mode changed from VNAV to Flight Level Change; MCP altitude selection changed from 7,000 ft to 3,000 ft; speedbrake handle extended and rate of descent increased5
12:38:04Flaps selected from up to position 1; autoflight go-around modes armed as flaps began to move5
12:38:26At about 6,500 ft, triaxial acceleration magnitudes increased, consistent with entering light to moderate turbulence5
12:38:31Autoflight system entered go-around mode; engines began advancing to go-around thrust; control column moved slightly aft, elevator deflected up, pitch began to increase, altitude stopped descending and began to climb5
12:38:37Speedbrake handle retracted; engines approached commanded go-around power settings5
12:38:40Master Caution and Autopilot Caution recorded; control column had moved to be deflected forward, pitch decreasing, airspeed accelerating rapidly from 240 knots; autoflight remained in go-around modes; shallow climb briefly then rapid descent; column remained forward for the next 10 seconds5
12:38:46Throttles brought to idle for about 2 seconds then re-advanced to previous power setting; pitch rapidly decreasing; vertical g negative for nearly 11 seconds5
12:38:47Split between left and right elevators noted, 2 to 7 degrees, until 12:38:575
12:38:55Overspeed and Master Warning alerts recorded with airspeed increasing beyond 350 knots6
12:38:57Altitude crossed through 3,000 ft; autothrottle switched out of go-around mode and engine TRA began to decrease6
12:38:58At about 2,000 ft the control column moved to the aft stop until the end of the recording; pitch about 50 degrees nose down6
12:39:03End of recording; vertical acceleration went from 0 g to 4.2 g; pitch increased rapidly to final recorded position of 16 degrees nose down6
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (manual, phase 1); 15 of 16 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

481 transcribed utterances from 11:57:59.1 to 12:39:02.0, 16 sources. Final entries:

12:38:58.9CAM[Sound of longer duration pulse tone about 1000 Hz, similar to Siren. Group could not determine if audible sounds lasted until end of recording.] 6
12:38:59.4CAM-3* pull up. [Shouted.]
12:39:00.9HOT-2[Unintelligible shout.]
12:39:02.0HOT-?(oh God). [Shouted.]
12:39:02.0HOT-2Lord * * you have my soul. [Shouted.]
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER ANCILLARY SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT3pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER ANCILLARY SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 1 (TABULAR DATA)csv
performanceAIRPLANE PERFORMANCE STUDY13pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT21pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 11csv
cvrCOCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT54pdf
cvrCVR SOUND SPECTRUM STUDY13pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA19MA086. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.