Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database
Airbus A321 — New York, NY, USA, 2019-04-11
NTSB number
DCA19LA134
Operator
American Airlines
Registration
N114NN
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Substantial
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.
NTSB summary
This accident occurred when an American Airlines Airbus A321 entered a left roll during takeoff from runway 31L at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The wind at the time resulted in a 14- to 17-knot crosswind from the right, which was below the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation. The initial takeoff roll proceeded normally, with the captain (the pilot flying) applying left rudder pedal to counter the right crosswind. The captain stated that he kept the airplane near the runway centerline and that “everything was ok” when the airplane reached 80 knots. When the airplane reached the rotation speed of 156 knots while still on the ground, the captain made a large left rudder pedal input, from 8° to 25°, during a 1.5-second timeframe. In response to this large rudder pedal input, the airplane’s heading deviated to the left, and its lateral acceleration increased to a maximum of 0.32 G.
During a postaccident interview, the captain stated the airplane made a “significant” turn to the left. The captain also stated that he was “looking at the runway edge” and knew he had to get the airplane into the air. Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data showed that the sidestick was pulled to its full nose-up position and a right sidestick position. During the aft sidestick and right sidestick application to rotate the airplane, the rudder remained close to its full-left deflection for 3 seconds. As the nose of the airplane lifted off the ground, the airplane began to roll to the left, and the left roll rate accelerated as the main landing gear lifted off the ground, reaching a maximum of 37° left wing down as the captain moved the rudder and sidestick to full right and to full aft. These movements arrested the left roll and allowed the airplane to continue to lift off.
The large left roll angle immediately after liftoff resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground and a runway distance marker, part of which remained imbedded in the wingtip. Airbus engineering simulations performed as part of this investigation demonstrated that the several seconds of near-maximum left rudder generated a rolling moment after the gear had left the ground to impart the left roll rate that the DFDR recorded. No airplane flight control abnormalities were noted, except for a left aileron deflection as the left wingtip scraped the ground. Thus, the left roll that occurred was in response to the captain’s left rudder pedal input during rotation of the airplane. Also, Airbus’ engineering simulations demonstrated that the airplane’s deviation to the left while on the ground was in response to the captain’s rudder pedal input; no abnormalities in the airplane’s response were noted.
In addition, American Airlines conducted a study of 13 months of takeoffs and found that the accident flight had a larger heading change, roll angle, maximum commanded rudder, and duration of maximum commanded rudder than the other takeoffs in the data set. Even though the crosswind that was occurring during the accident takeoff was about one-half of the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation, the accident airplane had a greater maximum deflection and a greater duration of input compared with all the other flights in the data set, including several flights with takeoffs that occurred with a stronger crosswind than the crosswind during the accident flight. Thus, the accident captain’s left rudder pedal input was excessive and not necessary for the crosswind that was present during the takeoff.
.
The captain’s excessive left rudder pedal input during the takeoff ground roll, which caused a large heading deviation and a left roll upon rotation that resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.
Flight data recorder
Airbus A321 · N114NN — 227,278 samples, 25 parameters, 20:40:00.0 to 21:09:59.9.
Parameter
Max
at
Min
at
Final
at
Pressure altitude ft
20,008.0
20:52:33.0
-88.0
21:08:43.5
-44.0
21:09:59.5
Computed airspeed kts
311.4
20:47:25.5
0.0
20:40:00.0
30.9
21:09:59.5
Vertical acceleration g
1.5
20:40:37.1
0.6
20:40:43.5
1.0
21:09:59.9
Magnetic heading deg
359.8
20:52:40.9
0.0
20:52:41.1
43.6
21:09:59.9
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).
Sequence of events (FDR factual report)
Time
Event
Page
20:39:50
Figure 2 begins, showing 90 seconds of basic parameters during the takeoff roll on runway 31L at KJFK
2
20:40:25
Figure 3 begins, showing 20 seconds of basic parameters during the takeoff roll at KJFK
2
20:40:36
Aircraft departed runway 31L at KJFK
2
unknown (during climb)
Aircraft climbed to a pressure altitude of 20,000 feet
2
unknown (post-climb)
Aircraft vectored back to KJFK
2
21:08:31
Aircraft landed on runway 04L
2
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 4 of 6 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.
Cockpit voice recorder
93 transcribed utterances from 19:40:08.6 to 20:41:48.3, 15 sources. Final entries:
20:41:48.3
INT-1
guys just be prepared for the worst case scenario. 21:00:54.5 okay, okay. thank you. FA-1 21:00:57.5 [3rd call for descent checklist] 21:02:25.3 [CAPT informs FO he's going off the radio for a moment]. 21:02:29.1 ah JFK operations American three hundred. RDO-1 DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:02:32.3 three hundred heard you're coming back go. OPS 21:02:34.5 yeah we're coming back, ah we had some kind of a flight
20:41:48.3
RDO-1
control malfunction I don't know but we're not gonna take this thing to LA until somebody looks at it but any way you got, you got a gate for us? 21:02:41.0 flaps1. HOT-2 21:02:46.1 forty six, give me a call when you're on the ground. OPS 21:02:48.1 okay gate forty six we'll do it thanks. RDO-1 21:03:01.7 [CAPT informs FO of a passenger reporting damage to left wing]. 21:03:45.2 [flaps 2]. 21:03:54.2 [flight cleared ILS 4L]. 21:04:19.9 [sounds consistent with gear down]. 21:04:42.1 [4th call for descent checklist]. 21:05:21.0 [flaps 3]. DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:05:41.8 [call for landing checklist]. 21:06:08.7 [flaps full]. 21:06:32.0 [flight switched to tower]. 21:06:50.5 [flight given reported winds of 010 / 17G23 and cleared to land 4L]. 21:07:59.7 [autopilot disconnect]. 21:08:36.2 [sounds consistent with landing]. 21:09:06.3 [sounds consistent with normal taxi to the gate]. 21:18:07.1 [discussion of error messages related to liquid level transmitter and AOA probe three]. 21:18:36.6 [call for shutdown checklist]. 21:19:37.0 dude there's extensive damage on that leading edge on that
20:41:48.3
RAMP
left hand side. bad damage. 21:19:41.7 what did you hit? RAMP 21:19:45.9 did we hit something? CAM-2 DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:19:48.6 I'm glad you guys made it * * * *. RAMP 21:19:51.2 yeah we hit something, because felt it, we felt it, we
20:41:48.3
CAM-2
we don't know but we rolled hard left. 21:19:52.7 yes. * * *. RAMP 21:19:55.9 I'm glad you guys are okay guys. RAMP 21:19:56.5 on ah on rotation, the airplane just rolled. CAM-1 21:19:57.7 yes. CAM-2 21:20:01.8 holy #. good thing we came back. CAM-2 21:20:28.8 flying great after that incident though, you know?
20:41:48.3
CAM-2
which is really weird. 21:22:58.9 [sound consistent with electrical power transition]. 21:23:46.2 [discussion with ground crew]. 21:25:25.7 [sounds consistent with cell phone calls discussing the event]. 21:43:41.9 [discussion of pulling the CVR circuit breaker]. DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.