Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 — Ypsilanti, MI, USA, 2017-03-08
NTSB number
DCA17FA076
Operator
Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
Registration
N786TW
Highest injury
Minor injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Substantial
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.
NTSB summary
The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-19/01.
On March 8, 2017, about 1452 eastern standard time, Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc., dba Ameristar Charters, flight 9363, a Boeing MD-83 airplane, N786TW, overran the departure end of runway 23L at Willow Run Airport, Ypsilanti, Michigan, after the captain executed a rejected takeoff. The 110 passengers and 6 flight crewmembers (two airline transport pilots and four flight attendants) evacuated the airplane via emergency escape slides. One passenger received a minor injury, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as an on-demand charter flight and was destined for Washington Dulles International Airport, Dulles, Virginia. Visual flight rules conditions prevailed at YIP at the time of the accident.
the jammed condition of the airplane's right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane's parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspection criteria for the airplane, and (2) the lack of a means to enable the flight crew to detect a jammed elevator during preflight checks for the Boeing MD-83 airplane. Contributing to the survivability of the accident was the captain's timely and appropriate decision to reject the takeoff, the check airman's disciplined adherence to standard operating procedures after the captain called for the rejected takeoff, and the dimensionally compliant runway safety area where the overrun occurred.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.
Flight data recorder
Boeing MD-83 · N786TW — 247,807 samples, 37 parameters, 47:59:52.0 to SRN 178,424.
Parameter
Max
at
Min
at
Final
at
Pressure altitude ft
37,008.0
SRN 174,402
13.0
SRN 173,318
496.0
SRN 178,423
Airspeed kts
321.2
SRN 173,817
0.0
47:59:52.3
0.0
SRN 178,423
Vertical acceleration g
1.5
SRN 173,271
0.7
SRN 173,277
1.0
SRN 178,424
Magnetic heading deg
357.9
SRN 172,981
0.3
SRN 172,982
15.5
SRN 178,423
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).
Sequence of events (FDR factual report)
Time
Event
Page
01:04 EST (178,423 SRN)
FDR stopped recording after previous landing (parking brake applied)
4
01:25 EST (178,432 SRN)
FDR started recording
3
01:33 EST (178,933 SRN)
FDR stopped recording
3
07:10 EST (178,940 SRN)
FDR started recording
3
07:12 EST (179,059 SRN)
FDR stopped recording
3
12:36 EST (179,068 SRN)
FDR started recording
3
12:37 EST (179,129 SRN)
FDR stopped recording
3
12:42 EST (179,140 SRN)
FDR started recording
3
12:49 EST (179,569 SRN)
FDR stopped recording
3
14:35 EST (179,580 SRN)
FDR started recording
3
14:38 EST (179,755 SRN)
FDR stopped recording
3
14:49 EST (179,764 SRN)
FDR started recording (last time before rejected takeoff)
3
14:49:43 EST
Aircraft began taxiing to the departure runway
4
14:52 EST (179,924 SRN)
End of FDR recording (rejected takeoff, runway excursion)
3
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 14 of 14 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.
Cockpit voice recorder
800 transcribed utterances from 12:50:06 to 14:53:47, 23 sources. Final entries:
14:52:41
CAM-2
it wasn't flying. it wasn't - I had it all the way back here it wasn't flying.
14:52:46
CAM
[sounds consistent with emergency evacuation of the cabin].
14:53:12
CAM-2
it was not rotating I had it all the way back here.
14:53:29
CAM-2
#.
14:53:47
HOT-1
evacuation checklist. 14:53:49 End of Recording 14:53:49 End of Transcript DCA17FA076
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.