FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOEING 767 — Chicago, IL, USA, 2016-10-28

NTSB number
DCA17FA021
Operator
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
Registration
N345AN
Highest injury
Serious injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Substantial
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report. The NTSB's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AccidentReports.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-18/01. On October 28, 2016, about 1432 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 383, a Boeing 767-323, N345AN, had started its takeoff ground roll at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, when an uncontained engine failure in the right engine and subsequent fire occurred. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 161 passengers on board, 1 passenger received a serious injury and 1 flight attendant and 19 passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged from the fire. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. 
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The failure of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk, which severed the main engine fuel feed line and breached the right main wing fuel tank, releasing fuel that resulted in a fire on the right side of the airplane during the takeoff roll. The HPT stage 2 disk failed because of low-cycle fatigue cracks that initiated from an internal subsurface manufacturing anomaly that was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in service inspections using the procedures in place. Contributing to the serious passenger injury was (1) the delay in shutting down the left engine and (2) a flight attendant's deviation from company procedures, which resulted in passengers evacuating from the left overwing exit while the left engine was still operating. Contributing to the delay in shutting down the left engine was (1) the lack of a separate checklist procedure for Boeing 767 airplanes that specifically addressed engine fires on the ground and (2) the lack of communication between the flight and cabin crews after the airplane came to a stop.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

Boeing 767-300 · N345AN — 33,886 samples, 67 parameters, 14:22:00.0 to 14:33:08.0.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Pressure altitude ft571.014:32:30.1538.014:25:11.1567.014:33:07.1
Computed airspeed kts384.014:22:03.40.014:22:00.40.014:33:07.4
Vertical acceleration g1.114:31:43.50.914:31:49.11.014:33:07.9
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
14:22:15Recording began with APU and left engine running3
14:22:20Right engine start sequence began with N2 rotation3
14:22:45Fuel switch moved from cutoff position3
14:23:20Autobrakes selected in RTO (rejected takeoff) position3
14:23:20APU was shut down (remained off for remainder of recording)3
14:31:20Takeoff attempt began; throttles advanced and engines accelerated to high power3
14:31:43.4Accel changes indicative of #2 engine failure4
14:31:44.7Throttles reduced to idle4
14:31:45.7RTO autobrakes activated4
14:31:45.9Peak recorded speeds4
14:31:47.5Auto speedbrakes activated4
14:31:48.6Peak deceleration achieved4
14:32:00ENG FIRE R message activated4
14:32:00.5Manual braking initiated4
14:32:08#2 engine fuel control moved to Cutoff4
14:32:09.8Aircraft came to a stop4
14:32:12#2 engine fire extinguisher activated4
14:32:16Parking brake set4
14:32:20Left overwing exit door opened4
14:32:38Forward left entry door opened4
14:32:42Forward right entry door opened4
14:32:48Aft left entry door opened4
14:33:08.9End of recording, #1 engine shut down4
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 16 of 23 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

6 transcribed utterances from 14:30:29.4 to 14:33:09.7, 4 sources. Final entries:

14:30:29.4TWRnovember five line up and wait. winds two zero zero at one four.
14:30:46.6TWRrunway two eight right at november five cleared for takeoff.
14:31:00.5RDO-2three heavy.
14:32:15.6TWRnow?
14:33:09.7PAevac this is the captain— HOT-2
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT15pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 11csv
cvrCOCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT15pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ERRATA 11pdf
cvrERRATA TO CVR GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT1pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA17FA021. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.