Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database
EMBRAER EMB145 — St Louis, MO, USA, 2016-02-24
NTSB number
DCA16LA100
Operator
TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
Registration
N856HK
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Substantial
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.
NTSB summary
The airplane was landing on runway 30L at STL in gusty crosswind conditions and the first officer was the pilot flying. The first officer questioned the captain on the use of flaps 45 on two occasions during the approach but ultimately decided to land with flaps 45. There were no airport limitations in effect for runway 6 at the time of the accident that would have precluded the flight crew's use of the runway 6. The flight crew had the performance numbers available to land on runway 6 which was more aligned with the wind conditions and would have reduced the crosswind component by more than half. During the flare, with the engines at flight idle, the airplane rolled left and then right when they encountered a wind gust. The left wingtip struck the runway followed by the right wingtip as the first officer advanced the thrust levers for a go-around. After the first officer advanced the thrust levers as the pilot flying, the captain, as pilot monitoring, reduced the engine power to idle for about 1 second before advancing them back to max thrust without a positive transfer of control. After the go-around, the first officer transferred control to the captain who subsequently performed an uneventful landing at flaps 22 on runway 30L.
the flight crews' failure to consider all available runways for landing to minimize the gusty crosswind component. Contributing to the accident was the captain's reduction of the engine thrust for about 1 second at low altitude immediately after the first officer applied maximum thrust to conduct a go-around.
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).
Sequence of events (FDR factual report)
Time
Event
Page
23:06:00 CST
Descent begins from pressure altitude of about 20,000 ft (start of Figures 2 and 3 data range)
3
23:15:33 CST
Autopilot status transitioned from engaged to not engaged and remained not engaged for the remainder of the flight, while descending through a pressure altitude of approximately 10,500 ft (about 41 minutes after takeoff)
3
23:19:39 CST
While descending through a pressure altitude of approximately 3,387 ft, radio altitude decreased from its maximum value of 2,550 ft to 2,532 ft and continued to decrease
3
23:22:15 CST
Start of missed approach data window (Figures 4 and 5)
3
23:22:52 CST
While at a radio altitude of 4 ft, gear weight on wheels changed from air to ground then switched back to air less than a second later while the master warning changed from off to on
3
23:23:03 CST
Master warning changed to off
3
23:23:06 CST
Master warning changed back to on, 3 seconds after previous change
3
23:23:10 CST
Master warning changed back to off and remained off for the remainder of the flight; radio altitude had increased to 210 ft
3
23:23:30 CST
End of missed approach data window (Figures 4 and 5)
3
23:24:16 CST
Radio altitude had increased to approximately 2,400 ft
3
23:27:13 CST
The aircraft began its final descent
4
23:30:32 CST
Gear weight on wheels transitioned to ground
4
23:32:00 CST
End of data range for Figures 2 and 3, about 1 minute and 28 seconds after final touchdown
3
23:34:24 CST
End of the event flight data
3
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 12 of 14 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.
Cockpit voice recorder
268 transcribed utterances from 23:04:30.0 to 23:31:28.8, 16 sources. Final entries:
23:31:04.3
RDO-2
quebec charlie to the ramp with you forty six fifteen.
23:31:08.5
PA-3
[unintelligible flight attendant announcement]
23:31:20.4
HOT-1
clear left.
23:31:21.9
HOT-2
clear right. DCA16LA100
23:31:28.8
TWR
and Waterski forty six fifteen when you get a chance give me a call on the phone if you don't mind. company will have the number or I can give it to you.
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.