Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database
BOEING 747-400 BCF — Bagram, AF, 2013-04-29
NTSB number
DCA13MA081
Operator
National Air Cargo
Registration
N949CA
Highest injury
Fatal · 7 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Destroyed
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.
NTSB summary
The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-15/01.
On April 29, 2013, about 1527 local time, a Boeing 747-400 BCF, N949CA, operated by National Air Cargo, Inc., dba National Airlines, crashed shortly after takeoff from Bagram Air Base, Bagram, Afghanistan. All seven crewmembers—the captain, first officer, loadmaster, augmented captain and first officer, and two mechanics—died, and the airplane was destroyed from impact forces and postcrash fire. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo flight was destined for Dubai World Central - Al Maktoum International Airport, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
National Airlines' inadequate procedures for restraining special cargo loads, which resulted in the loadmaster's improper restraint of the cargo, which moved aft and damaged hydraulic systems Nos. 1 and 2 and horizontal stabilizer drive mechanism components, rendering the airplane uncontrollable. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's inadequate oversight of National Airlines' handling of special cargo loads.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.
Flight data recorder
Boeing B747-400 · N949CA — 5,401 samples, 15 parameters, 07:50:00.0 to 09:20:00.0.
Parameter
Max
at
Min
at
Final
at
Computed airspeed kts
337.0
08:17:48.0
0.0
07:50:00.0
0.0
09:19:59.0
Pitch attitude deg
17.0
08:04:49.0
-4.0
09:06:50.0
0.0
09:19:59.0
Roll attitude deg
27.4
08:15:57.0
-25.0
09:03:58.0
0.0
09:19:59.0
Vertical acceleration g
1.3
09:07:13.0
0.6
08:56:14.0
1.0
09:19:59.0
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).
Sequence of events (FDR factual report)
Time
Event
Page
07:50 GMT (previous flight)
FDR began recording for the previous flight from Camp Bastion; aircraft took off at 08:04 from runway 19 with maximum pitch after rotation of 17 degrees; cruise at around 29,000 ft reached at 08:30 with descent about 20 minutes later; vertical acceleration perturbations of +0.62 g to +1.36 g in the descent; landed at Bagram runway 03 at 09:09 with minimum longitudinal acceleration -0.27 g; last fuel 46,200 lb, gross weight 617,280 lb; FDR stopped at 09:19:28
4
10:41:23 GMT
FDR began recording for the accident flight; total fuel 106,000 lb, gross weight 677,120 lb
4
10:44 GMT
Flaps lowered to 10 degrees, leading edge flaps extended, flight control check performed
4
10:55:47 GMT
Last radio call before takeoff after taxiing and lining up on runway 03
4
10:55:54 GMT
N1 for all four engines began to increase, reaching full power at 10:56:11
4
10:56:33 GMT
At 137 knots the pitch parameter began to increase (rotation)
4
10:56:40 GMT
Slight right roll of +2 degrees recorded
4
10:56:42 GMT
One sample of the air/ground sensor transitioning from ground to air at 163 knots; the sensor toggled between air and ground over the next 1.5 seconds
4
10:56:45 GMT
Last recorded data point: airspeed 171 knots, pitch 13 degrees, roll +4 degrees right, radio altitude 33 ft, gross weight 675,200 lb; the CVR ceased at approximately the same moment; other sources indicate the flight continued past this time
4
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 0 of 9 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.
Cockpit voice recorder
233 transcribed utterances from 09:57:33 to 10:56:47, 16 sources. Final entries:
10:56:38
HOT-1
rotate.
10:56:44
HOT-1
positive climb.
10:56:45
HOT-2
gear up.
10:56:46
HOT-1
keep on that (wing/weight/wait).
10:56:47
CAM
[End of Recording, End of Transcript] E
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.