FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

Bombardier, Inc. CRJ-100 — Lexington, KY, USA, 2006-08-27

NTSB number
DCA06MA064
Operator
COMAIR INC
Registration
N431CA
Highest injury
Fatal · 49 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Destroyed
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-07/05. On August 27, 2006, about 0606:35 eastern daylight time, Comair flight 5191, a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA, crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take off from runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47 passengers were killed, and the first officer received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and was en route to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

the flight crewmembers's failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

— 58,378 samples, 95 parameters, 05:59:00.0 to 06:06:36.1.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Vertical acceleration g3.106:06:35.80.106:06:33.33.106:06:35.8
Engine 1 N1 %RPM91.206:06:13.20.005:59:00.280.006:06:35.2
Engine 2 N1 %RPM91.806:06:29.70.005:59:00.774.306:06:34.7
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
05:59:37-06:00:48 EDTLeft turn from about 130 degrees magnetic heading to 46.3 (left) / 48.9 (right) degrees5
06:00:14-06:01:26 EDTEngine 1 N1 increased from 0% to 26% (06:00:44); Engine 2 N1 from 0% to 25% (06:01:26) - engine start5
06:02:18 EDTControl checks began, ending about 31 seconds later; right MFD range changed 10 nm to 40 nm at 06:02:24 and radar overlay became active four seconds later5
06:02:15-06:04:20 EDTSeveral heading changes, finally reaching 40.3 (left) and 41.6 (right) degrees; left MFD range 40 nm to 80 nm at 06:04:345
06:04:36-06:05:22 EDTLongitudinal acceleration indicates the airplane was not moving (holding short)5
06:05:39-06:06:00 EDTLeft turn to 266.5 (left) / 265.8 (right) degrees - lined up on runway 26 rather than runway 22; both autopilot lateral takeoff modes engaged as of 06:05:505
06:06:00-06:06:13 EDTEngine 1 and 2 N1 increased, reaching 91% at 06:06:12 and 06:06:13; computed airspeed began increasing at 06:06:055
06:06:30 EDTAt 127 knots right computed airspeed the control columns began moving aft; elevators trailing edge up the following second; maximum aft column 10.9 degrees (right) at 06:06:33 at 135 knots; maximum elevator 22.6 degrees TEU (right) at 06:06:326
06:06:32 EDTRight pitch reached 4.7 deg ANU, dropped to 0 the following second, then left pitch 6.7 deg ANU rising to a maximum 15.9 deg ANU (right) over the next two seconds; vertical acceleration 1.199 g, 0.766 g, then 2.742 g; gear WOW indicated air (left briefly ground then air); radio altitudes began increasing; engine N1 began decreasing6
06:06:33-06:06:34 EDTRight stick shaker active at 06:06:33, then left stick shaker and both stick pushers active; left aileron to 24.9 deg right wing down, left flight spoiler to 42 deg; roll to 17.4 deg left wing down (06:06:35); right rudder pedal 5.7 deg and rudder 10.1 deg TER; nose gear WOW air at 06:06:336
06:06:35 EDTLeft computed airspeed 136.75 knots; left angle of attack 13.3 deg (maximum); final vertical acceleration 3.113 g; longitudinal acceleration 0.736 g; final pitch 12.7 deg ANU; Engine N1 final values 80% (06:06:35) and 74% (06:06:34); lateral acceleration 0.135 g then -0.096 g6
06:06:36 EDTNose and right gear WOW returned to ground; end of valid data6
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 8 of 12 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

356 transcribed utterances from 05:36:07.7 to 06:06:36.2, 23 sources. Final entries:

06:06:34.7CAM[sound similar to stall warning starts and continues to end of re- cording]
06:06:35.1HOT-?#.
06:06:35.7HOT-1[unintelligible exclamation]
06:06:36.2ENDof RECORDING
06:06:36.2ENDof TRANSCRIPT
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman24pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1: Tabular Datacsv
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (Transcript)43pdf
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Errata to CVR Factual Report1pdf
performanceAircraft Performance 13 - Wreckage Site Factual Report of Group Chairman14pdf
performanceAircraft Performance 13 - Performance Study of Group Chairman10pdf
cvrAircraft Performance 13 - Attachment 1 - CVR Overlay2pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA06MA064. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.