FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOEING 757-223 — Chicago, IL, USA, 2008-09-22

NTSB number
CHI08IA292
Operator
American Airlines, Inc.
Registration
N197AN
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Minor
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

While performing the cockpit preflight, the captain noticed that the standby horizon was unpowered. After cycling the Standby Power Selector and the Battery Switch, the captain noted that five status messages were displayed on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS) screen, although he could not remember the specific messages. Maintenance personnel subsequently cleared the messages and told the crew they were "good to go," without making a logbook entry. Approximately 30 minutes after takeoff several cockpit lights flickered; multiple EICAS messages appeared, including the AIR/GRD SYS caution message; the Standby Power OFF light illuminated; the autopilot disconnect warning sounded; and the autothrottles disconnected. The first officer referenced the STANDBY BUS OFF procedure in the QRH, turning the Standby Power selector to the BAT position. The QRH states that when BAT is selected the battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes. Although the QRH did not instruct the crew to divert to the nearest suitable airport, it indicates that the battery will supply bus power for approximately 30 minutes and the captain reported to maintenance that the battery would be depleted. After consulting with company maintenance specialists, the crew elected to continue the flight. Battery power was depleted and numerous essential aircraft systems began to fail about 2 hours and 24 minutes after the flight crew switched the Standby Power selector to the BAT position. These systems included the stabilizer trim, the captain’s instrumentation, thrust reversers, anti-skid and others. The flight diverted to the closest airport, an emergency was declared, and the airplane was cleared to land on the 7,500-foot-long runway; the captain stated that due to problems controlling the airplane, he did not want to circle to land on a longer runway. The airplane touched down hard about 2,500 feet down the runway. The crew determined they were going to overrun the end of the runway, so the captain veered the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass, where the airplane came to rest with seven of the eight main gear tires either blown out or deflated. Postaccident investigation revealed erosion on the B contacts within the K106 relay; a failure of the K106 electrical relay would result in the events described by the crew.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The failure of an electrical relay due to eroded contacts and the flight crew's decision to continue a flight that was operating on battery power.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
09:49:00-10:00:57 CDTBefore takeoff airspeed invalid (FDAU not receiving data); main battery 28 VDC5
10:00:57 CDTTakeoff roll began; climb to 37,000 ft, level at 10:245
10:20:47 CDTFaults recorded for left and right main pitot heat and left AOA probe heat5
10:25:35 CDTMain battery voltage spiked to about 31 VDC5
10:30:55 CDTPitot/AOA heat faults cleared; main battery indicated discharging at -24 A and voltage began decreasing (battery carrying loads - generator/bus loss)5
12:53:32 CDTMain battery discharge indicated normal; battery voltage 15 VDC5
12:54:37-12:56:07 CDTLeft main pitot heat fault (12:54:37), computed airspeed cycling 0-320 kts from 12:55:31, left AOA heat fault (12:55:37), right main pitot heat fault (12:56:07)5
12:56:47 CDTLowest main battery voltage 5 VDC5
12:57:32-12:57:38 CDTComputed airspeed and pressure altitude invalid to the end of the recording; Air Data Computer failure recorded5
13:17:47 CDTDescent began (from pitch and engine indications, air data being invalid)5
13:41:58 CDTGear weight-on-wheels indicated ground (landing ORD 22R)5
13:42:00 CDTFDR recording ended (recorder lost power at the air/ground transition)5
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 0 of 1 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

944 transcribed utterances from 11:43:23 to 13:46:45, 27 sources. Final entries:

13:46:37HOT-1okay they're gonna put up some stairs.
13:46:41HOT-2unbelievable.
13:46:44CAM[sound similar to power interruption] CHI08IA292
13:46:44CAM-?okay.
13:46:45CAM[sound similar to engine spooldown]
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report11pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Attachment 1 - Tabular Data - Flight - (CSV Format)csv
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman94pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=CHI08IA292. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.