FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 — Milwaukee, WI, USA, 2011-06-07

NTSB number
CEN11IA379
Operator
SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
Registration
N866AS
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Minor
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

During final approach, the transport-category airplane's right main landing gear (MLG) did not extend when the landing gear selector was placed in the "down" position. Shortly after, the flight crew noted a "gear disagree" warning message displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system showing that the nose gear and the left MLG were down and locked but that the right MLG was in transit. The flight crew followed the quick reference handbook directions to troubleshoot the landing gear issue without success. The flight crewmembers then tried to manually extend the landing gear by pulling the landing gear alternate release handle multiple times; however, the right MLG failed to extend, and they subsequently landed the airplane with the right MLG retracted. During postincident activities, the airplane was lifted and an examination revealed that the right MLG remained in its full-up position within the wheel well. The airplane's right MLG uplock pin exhibited signs of slight wear, consistent with in-service usage, and no abnormalities were found with the right MLG uplock assembly. Normal wear patterns were observed on the uplock latch with no discernable depth at the pin contact locations. The uplock pin's slight wear indicates that it might not have always rotated freely when it was in contact with the upper and lower surfaces of the uplock assembly latch as it should have per the system's design. Further, the worn pin could have increased the friction forces between the pin and the latch. Functional testing of the incident airplane's 3A and 3B hydraulic system pumps showed that their output pressures were lower than specified. Analysis of hydraulic fluid samples taken from the No. 3 hydraulic system, including the right sidestay actuator and selected landing gear components, revealed that some of the fluid samples contained particles and fibers that exceeded the in-service size limits specified in the airplane's maintenance manual, and these contaminants likely restricted the hydraulic flow within the hydraulic assembly. It is unlikely that any of these factors (the slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, or the contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system) would have individually prevented the right MLG from extending; however, it is likely that the combination of these factors prevented the right MLG from extending. In addition, the overall landing gear system design, including modifications made in accordance with an airworthiness directive, did not preclude the consequence that the intermittent combination of these factors prevented the right MLG from extending normally. Postincident examination of the cockpit revealed that the landing gear alternate release handle remained extended about 7 inches. Pulling up on the handle resulted in it moving about 3 additional inches to its fully extended position. The additional handle displacement resulted in the right MLG extending out of its wheel well. When the handle was released from its fully extended position, the handle automatically began to slowly retract, which caused the right MLG to stop extending. The handle had to be pulled and manually held in its fully extended position for the right MLG to extend to its down-and-locked position. During postincident functional testing of the landing gear alternate release handle assembly, the handle's locking mechanism failed to maintain the handle in its fully extended position when a specified retract load was applied to the assembly. Disassembly of the handle assembly did not reveal any mechanical discrepancies. However, the assembly's inner housing and outer slider were found coated with an oily material consistent with lubricant; the origin of the oily material could not be determined. The alternate release handle assembly design specifications do not call for the application of lubricant on the inner housing or the outer slider; therefore, it is likely that the lubricant prevented the handle from remaining in its fully extended position.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The failure of the right main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally, which resulted from the combination of a slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, and contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system. Also causal to the accident was the failure of the right MLG to extend manually using the alternate gear selector handle due to the improper use of lubricant within the alternate release handle assembly, which prevented the handle from remaining in its fully extended position.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

· N866AS — 254,748 samples, 44 parameters, 19:45:09.0 to 21:34:01.0.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Vertical acceleration g1.321:33:04.80.821:33:25.51.021:34:00.9
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
20:52:36 CDTAbout 1 hour after takeoff, descending through 2,745 ft, the left landing gear transitioned to Down and Locked3
20:52:40 CDTNose gear Down and Locked at about 2,618 ft3
20:52:58 CDTLanding gear disagree warning Active at about 2,217 ft (right gear not down)3
20:54:20-20:54:21 CDTRight gear briefly Down and Locked at about 2,869 ft (climbing); gear disagree warning back to Not Active a second later3
20:54:57-20:55:00 CDTRight gear back to Not Down and Locked; left and nose gear also Not Down and Locked (gear retracted)3
20:55-21:04:57 CDTHolding at about 4,150 ft: nose gear cycled six times between Not Down and Locked and Down and Locked, then stayed Down and Locked to touchdown; right gear Down and Locked and back from 21:00:36 to 21:01:063
21:05:40 CDTHydraulic system 3 pressure dropped from about 2,720 psi to 14 psi (system 3 pumps cycled during gear troubleshooting)3
21:05:40-21:13:14 CDTHydraulic pressure 3 cycled: up to 2,720 psi, down to 10 psi, up to 2,700, down to 14, then up to 2,680 psi where it remained to touchdown; altitude steady at about 4,150 ft3
21:19:50 CDTLeft gear Down and Locked (remained so) at about 900 ft4
21:33:04-21:33:05 CDTLeft gear WOW Air to Ground, nose gear WOW Ground one second later - landing on 19R with the right main gear retracted; recording ended 21:34:004
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 10 of 10 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman12pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman15pdf
fdrFDR Attachment 1 - Tab Data Event Fltcsv
fdrFDR Attachment 2 - Tab Data Prev Fltcsv

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=CEN11IA379. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.