Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database
EMBRAER EMB-145 — Chicago, IL, USA, 2011-06-03
NTSB number
CEN11IA369
Operator
AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC
Registration
N607AE
Highest injury
No injury
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
—
Cohort
Part 121 airline
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.
NTSB summary
The pilots reported that they felt one brake pedal fully release and then reapply during the landing roll. Air traffic control tower personnel saw a puff of smoke and asked the flight crew if a tire had blown on landing. The pilots taxied the airplane to a hold pad for further examination; however, the emergency brake would not hold the airplane stationary. The pilots also received caution messages for the brakes, and hydraulic fluid was observed on the tires and ground. An examination revealed the brake pressure plate and rotor failed. Separated brake parts were also found on the landing runway. Further examination of the incident brake and four other brakes revealed that they all contained varying levels of oxidation development.
The brake manufacturer had previously provided the operator with a maintenance procedure which involved using a fingernail or a specified plastic tool to check brakes for oxidation. The operator developed and provided related training to its maintenance personnel based on the manufacturer's procedures. However, interviews with airline and contract maintenance personnel revealed that they were not familiar with the inspection and were not issued the plastic tool. Subsequently, the brake manufacturer and operator provided additional related training to the operator's maintenance personnel, and the operator stocked their maintenance system with the specified tool.
The overheat and failure the brake during landing due to oxidation of the brake rotors, which went undetected by maintenance personnel. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s lack of familiarity with detailed brake oxidation inspection procedures.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.
Flight data recorder
— 841 samples, 20 parameters, 06:01:50.0 to 06:15:50.0.
Parameter
Max
at
Min
at
Final
at
Vertical acceleration g
1.1
06:03:52.0
0.9
06:03:59.0
1.0
06:15:49.0
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).
Sequence of events (FDR factual report)
Time
Event
Page
06:03:58 CDT
Air/ground switch first recorded ground at 132 kts indicated airspeed, then air for 2 s before ground again (bounce/skip)
2
06:04:00-06:04:10 CDT
Brake pressures #1 and #3 increased, peaking at 1,426 and 1,534 psi within 10 s; maximum longitudinal deceleration -0.39 g at 06:04:10
2
after 06:04:10 CDT
#3 brake pressure decreased to a nominal value and stayed there for the rest of the recording (brake failure/separation)
2
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 2 of 3 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.